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Disarming Employees
HOW AMERICAN EMPLOYERS ARE USING
MANDATORY ARBITRATION TO DEPRIVE WORKERS
OF LEGAL PROTECTION
Jean R. Sternlight†
I’ll let you write the substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and
I’ll screw you every time.1
INTRODUCTION
Congress and state legislatures have passed many laws to
protect American workers,2 but these laws are worthless if they
cannot be enforced. In the United States we have largely depended
on employees to bring individual claims or class actions to protect
their rights to be free from discrimination, paid a fair wage,
provided a safe workplace, and given reasonable benefits.3 While
† Saltman Professor of Law and Director of Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I thank Hiro Aragaki, Alex
Colvin, Mark Gough, Jill Gross, AnnHodges, JeremyMcClane, AnnMcGinley, Elaine Shoben,
and Nancy Welsh for their very useful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am also
grateful to librarian Jennifer Gross and to research assistants Andrew Dunning, Haley Lewis,
SarahMead and Erica Nannini for their extensive help.
1 Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law & Governmental Regulations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
2 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206-207 (2012); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (2012); Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-e17 (2012) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of race, gender, national
origin, and other categories) Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102-12213
(2012).States also have statutory and common law protecting worker rights. See, e.g.,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 613 (2013) (detailing law regarding such matters as fraudulent
representations by employment agents, prohibition of involuntary servitude, and
penalty for obtaining employment by false letters of recommendation).
3 See Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law
Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1070 n.2 (2014) (showing that
private plaintiffs file many more employment discrimination and FLSA suits than
government agencies file on their behalf). For further discussion of the United States’
reliance on employees to litigate their own protection, see generally SEAN FARHANG,
THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S.
(2010); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
1310 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4
relying on employees to bring lawsuits to protect their own rights
has left many workers without access to justice,4 at least litigation
has protected some employees,5 and the threat of litigation has
protected many others.6
Today employers, with substantial assistance from the
Supreme Court, are using mandatory arbitration7 clauses to
“disarm” employees, effectively preventing them from bringing
most individual or class claims and thereby obtaining access to
justice. It has been estimated that roughly 20% of the non-
unionized American workforce is covered by mandatory arbitration
provisions,8 and this number may well increase.9 Whereas the
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes10 has received substantial
4 See, e.g., ANN BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (2009)
[hereinafter BROKEN LAWS], available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/
BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1 (surveying 4,387 workers in low wage industries
and concluding that “the core protections that many Americans take for granted—the
right to be paid at least the minimum wage, the right to be paid for overtime hours, the
right to take meal breaks, access to workers’ compensation when injured, and the right
to advocate for better working conditions—are failing significant numbers of workers”).
5 See infra Part III.B.
6 See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing class, collective action, and group claims).
7 I call “mandatory” those arbitration provisions that are imposed by
employers on their employees as non-negotiated contracts of adhesion. While some
higher-level executives do enter into arbitration agreements voluntarily, or at least
knowingly, the bulk of employees who are covered by arbitration clauses contained in
employee handbooks or other small print documents are not aware that they have waived
their rights to go to court. See Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and
Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 59, 64-65 (2014) (distinguishing “individually negotiated” and
“employer promulgated” plans and finding that 72.4% of employment arbitrations
handled by American Arbitration Association arise out of “employer promulgated” plans).
8 Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007)
(estimating that between 15% and 25% of employers have imposed employment
arbitration). A recent article raises questions about the validity of Colvin’s estimate,
which was originally taken from studies of the telecommunications industry. David B.
Lipsky et al., Mandatory Employment Arbitration: Dispelling the Myths, 32
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 138 (2014). Yet, the same article also notes that
“Colvin’s estimates for the telecommunications industry remain the best empirical estates
that we have of the coverage of mandatory arbitration provisions.” Id. at 141.
9 While the growth of the usage of mandatory employment arbitration may
have slowed, additional companies may well now impose mandatory employment
arbitration as a means of avoiding class action suits. Lipsky et al, supra note 8 at 141. A
recent study of over 300 general counsels by defense firm Carlton Fields Jorden Burt
found that whereas just 16.1% of the companies surveyed used arbitral class action
prohibitions in 2012, 42.7% used such prohibitions in 2014. THE 2015 CARLTON FIELDS
JORDENBURTCLASSACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES INREDUCINGCOST ANDMANAGING
RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 26 (2015), available at http://classactionsurvey.com/
pdf/2015-class-action-survey.pdf; see also Lauren Weber, Careers: Companies Block Staff
From Filing Suits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2015, at B1.
10 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (vacating certification
of class of over a million women who sought to sue Wal-Mart stores across the country for
gender discrimination, reasoning that the class had failed to demonstrate sufficient
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attention for its potential to limit employment discrimination class
actions,11 employers’ use of mandatory arbitration can be even
more detrimental to non-unionized employees.12 Employers are
using arbitration clauses to make it more difficult for employees to
bring successful individual claims in any forum13 and also to
eliminate the threat of class actions or even collective or group
claims in both litigation and arbitration.14 Indeed, while some
might think the Wal-Mart decision has rendered arbitral class
action prohibitions unnecessary, instead it may have made
arbitral class action prohibitions even more attractive to
employers by encouraging plaintiff-side attorneys to file a greater
commonality among their claims); see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426
(2013) (rejecting certification of proposed class action on the ground that common
consumer claims did not predominate over individual claims).
11 Law firm Seyfarth Shaw reports that the Wal-Mart and Comcast decisions
have together had a “profound influence in shaping the course of class action litigation
rulings throughout 2013,” by prompting employers to mount more class certification
challenges and causing employers to “settle[ ] fewer employment discrimination class
actions than at any time over the past decade and at a fraction of the levels of 2006 to
2012.” SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 2
(2014), available at http://www.seyfarth-classaction.com/2014/2014wcar/index.html.
Academics are exploring ways for employees and their attorneys to work around the
impact of Wal-Mart. See generally, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, After
Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 623 (2012) (urging that state attorneys general use their “parens patriae authority”
to help fill regulatory gap left by likely demise of class actions following the Concepcion
and Wal-Mart decisions); Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice After
Wal-Mart: The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (2013) (exploring ways in which
EEOC can step in to protect employees who can no longer participate in nation-wide class
actions after Wal-Mart); cf. Dustin Massie, Too Soon for Employers to Celebrate?: How
Plaintiffs Are Prevailing Post-Dukes, 29 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177 (2014) (questioning
whetherWal-Mart’s impact has been as negative for employees as many had predicted).
12 This article focuses only on the non-unionized workplace. Arbitration plays
out very differently in the roughly 11% of the workplace that is unionized, where
unions enter into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) on behalf of their members,
and where arbitration is customarily used to resolve disputes over the interpretation of
the CBA. While some employers also use the CBA to require union members to
arbitrate individual statutory claims, at least some unions substantially assist their
members with arbitration claims. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009)
(allowing employers to mandate individual arbitration in the unionized context so long
as union agrees to clause and employees are not precluded from vindicating their
federally protected rights).
13 See infra Parts III.A, B.1 & B.2. Mandatory employment arbitration can also
be critiqued for privatizing what ought to be public claims. See, e.g., Judith Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the
Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2601132; Theresa M. Beiner, The Many Lanes Out of Court:
Against Privatization of Employment Discrimination Disputes, 73 MD. L. REV. 837 (2014).
14 See infra text accompanying note 36; see also infra Parts I & III(C)(3).
“Collective claims” are those brought under the FLSA, or similar statutes, that require
plaintiffs to opt-in to the multi-plaintiff suit. “Group claims” are those involving two or
potentially more plaintiffs who choose to bring their litigation in the same lawsuit.
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number of smaller regional class actions rather than fewer
national class actions.15
Employers’ use of mandatory arbitration to decrease
employees’ access to justice is highly disappointing and ironic.
Some arbitration commentators have urged that arbitration can be
quicker, cheaper, and simpler than litigation, thus offering an
accessible venue for employees who cannot litigate their claims in
court.16 Yet available empirical evidence now shows that
mandatory employment arbitration is bringing about the opposite
result—eroding rather than boosting employees’ access to justice
by suppressing employees’ ability to file claims. This evidence
reveals that employees who are covered by mandatory arbitration
provisions almost never file arbitration claims.17 The empirical
evidence also provides important insights as to why so few
employees file claims in arbitration: (1) employees win less often
and win less money in arbitration than in litigation;18 (2)
attorneys are less willing to take employee claims that are headed
to arbitration rather than litigation;19 (3) arbitration is not a
hospitable venue for pro se employees;20 and (4) arbitration is
being used to eradicate the class actions, collective actions, and
even group litigation that are essential to many employees.21
15 Massie, supra note 11, at 188, 200-01 (finding that heightened standard
enunciated in Wal-Mart “has resulted in the filing of multiple class actions on a regional
basis, increasing the likelihood of each mini-class going forward . . . [amounting to a] new
strategy of ‘death by a thousand cuts’”). For a discussion of the relationship between the
Court’s arbitration and class action decisions, see Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A
Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 78 (2011).
16 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility:
Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008) (“The empirical evidence
suggests that arbitration may be a more accessible forum than court for lower income
employees”); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563
(2001) (“A properly designed arbitration system . . . can do a better job of delivering
accessible justice for average claimants than a litigation-based approach”); Lewis L.
Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 29, 30 (1998) (urging that because mediation and arbitration are “generally much
less expensive than litigation, [these processes may] bring justice within the reach of
many to whom it is currently denied”); Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and
Employment Law During the Past Quarter Century, 25 A.B.A. J. OF LAB. & EMP. L. 411,
417-18 (2010) (suggesting arbitration is more accessible to lower paid workers than
litigation); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water and Constructing a New Sink in
the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999) (arguing that while imperfect, mandatory
arbitration is superior to litigation from perspective of both employees and employers).
17 See infra Parts III.A & B.
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part III.B.1.
20 See infra Part III.B.2.
21 See infra Part III.B.3.
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While, in theory, employees might be protected through
means other than either litigation or arbitration, the current
practical realities are more bleak. With the rate of unionization
now below 7% in the private sector,22 we cannot count on unions to
help workers.23 Nor are state and federal bureaucracies sufficiently
well-funded to protect all workers,24 and there currently appears to
be no political will to increase these bureaucracies.25 Although
enhancing internal enforcement mechanisms, including improved
worker democracy and self-governance, may be the best means of
improving the workplace, long term,26 employers have little
incentive to use such mechanisms if they can evade regulation
altogether. Thus, absent Congressional action restricting
employers’ ability to use mandatory arbitration to deregulate
the workplace,27 we will continue to see employers free themselves
to violate wage and hour laws, to discriminate, to impose unsafe
22 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-14-0095, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS:
ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE (2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.
nr0.htm (providing unionization numbers for 2013 including overall unionization rate of
11.3 % and private sector rate of 6.7%).
23 Indeed, several commentators have noted that employers use some of the
same management practices to help avoid both unionization and litigation. Cynthia
Estlund, Employment Rights and Workplace Conflict, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS 55 (William K. Roche, et al. eds., 2014);
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies and the Rise
of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 375, 375
(2003). Nonetheless, some are more optimistic than this author that unions may help
non-member employees who are covered by mandatory arbitration clauses. See Ann C.
Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 1682 (2014) (arguing that employers’ use of arbitration clauses to limit employees’
ability to vindicate their rights provides unions with an organizing opportunity); See
also Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in Discrimination Disputes as a
Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
55 (2004) (urging unions to help both unionized and non-unionized black employees
bring discrimination claims in litigation or arbitration).
24 Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 270-75 (1995) (urging that the EEOC lacks resources to pursue most
meritorious cases and instead leaves most charging parties to pursue their own
remedies); Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates
that Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1111-15
(stating that federal and many state agencies are not adequately enforcing wage and hour
laws); Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in
Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1996) (describing EEOC
procedures as a “strange and vacuous process—one where thousands of claims are filed at
no financial cost to the plaintiff, few are truly investigated, fewer still resolved, and none
of which is binding on any of the parties”); St. Antoine, supra note 16, at 418 (observing
that the EEOC is too underfunded and understaffed to help most employees).
25 FARHANG, supra note 3, at 3-4 (discussing that dominance of private
enforcement model for employment discrimination suits is product of legislative choice).
26 See generally, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE:
FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
27 See, e.g, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015); see
also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015); see also infra Part IV.
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working, and to otherwise violate federal and state labor and
employment laws with impunity.
In examining the impact of mandatory arbitration on the
workplace it is important to recognize the tremendous variety
among employees, potential employment claims, and arbitration
clauses. Policymakers and commentators who unconsciously focus
on one particular type of claim, claimant, or arbitration clause may
fail to realize that a dispute resolution system that works well for
certain kinds of claims may not work well for others. For example,
although many academics and members of the public may still
think “discrimination” when they conceptualize claims employees
bring against their employer,28 employees instead often seek to
bring claims regarding wage and hour violations, contractual
issues, fraud, denials of benefits, or other matters.29 Such claims
may vary substantially in terms of legal and factual complexity.30
Further, arbitration clauses themselves may differ in many
ways including what if any arbitration provider is named,31 how
28 Ruan, supra note 24, at 1105 (stating that “the focus on employment
arbitration is mostly centered on employment discrimination and the difficulties of
arbitration as a forum for complex burden-shifting liability. But wage claims are
significantly different and bring a different set of considerations that must be
addressed when evaluating the benefits and burdens of the arbitration forum”).
29 In federal court in 2013 employees commenced 15,266 discrimination claims,
7,500 FLSA claims, and 7,599 ERISA claims. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2013
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
TABLE C-2A (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/
2013/appendices/C02ASep13.pdf [hereinafter “TABLEC-2A”].
30 An hourly employee who is seeking to prove that she was not paid for
working certain hours would need to present only fairly simple evidence of the work
done and payments made. In contrast, it would be far more complicated for a
prospective employee to try to prove that the fire department discriminates against
women by using a certain physical examination. Such a claim requires mastery of legal
doctrine, complex evidence and expert testimony. Similarly, an employee who seeks to
argue that she is entitled to overtime under the FLSA may have to analyze the statute,
relevant regulations, and precedent in order to prevail. Also, if an employee’s claim
turns on evidence in the employee’s possession, such as pay stubs or contracts, the
claim is far easier than if the employee would need to use discovery to obtain evidence
from the employer, such as other employees’ files, in order to prevail.
31 A recent study found that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) was
named provider in 50% of employment arbitration clauses, that JAMS was named
provider in 20% of clauses, and that the remaining clauses either did not name a
provider or named a number of smaller providers. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & MARK D.
GOUGH, COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION: ACCESS, PROCESS AND
OUTCOMES: RESEARCH REPORT TO THE ROBERT L. HABUSH ENDOWMENT OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE 34-35 (Apr. 2, 2014) [hereinafter COMPARING
MANDATORY ARBITRATION] (on file with author). Some providers may require that the
clause adhere to a “due process protocol” or similarly-named document adopted by the
provider. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N., EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES (effective Nov. 1, 2009), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=
/UCM/ADRSTG_004362&revision=latestreleased [hereinafter AAA EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION RULES] (setting out AAA authority to decline cases where employer has
failed to comply with Due Process Protocol); see also Richard A. Bales, The Employment
2015] DISARMING EMPLOYEES 1315
arbitrators are selected,32 the size of costs and their allocation
between employer and employee,33 how much discovery is
permitted,34 the arbitration location,35 whether class or collective
actions or joined claims are precluded,36 whether statutes of
limitations are shortened,37 whether certain kinds of relief are
precluded,38 whether employees are given a chance to opt out of the
clause,39 and many other matters. Differences among claimants,
claims, and clauses will impact whether the employee files a claim,
whether the claim is feasible on an individual basis, whether the
employee is able to retain an attorney to assist with the claim, and
how well the employee does if an arbitration claim is filed.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part I
discusses the Supreme Court arbitration decisions that have
enabled employers to protect themselves from employment claims.
Part II compares substantive results in arbitration and in
litigation. While many commentators, journalists, and policy
Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of
Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165 (2005) (reviewing history of AAA
employment due process protocol and how it has been enforced).
32 Under AAA rules arbitrators are selected jointly by employer and employee
from a list prepared by AAA, using a system whereby each side is able to strike out
undesired arbitrators. AAA EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 31, at 44.
However, clauses do not always use an arbitration provider nor a fair selection
mechanism. E.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935, 940-41 (4th
Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce purported arbitration clause on the ground that it was
too unfair in that it required all arbitrators to be selected from company’s list).
33 The AAA requires that employers pay a non-refundable $1,350 in cases
filed by an employee against the employer. AAA EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 31, at 32. However, many employment arbitration clauses do impose
significant costs on employees. See Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment
Arbitration: The State of the Law and the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 363 (2007).
34 The AAA affords the arbitrator discretion to regulate discovery. AAA
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 31, at 26. However, some employment
arbitration clauses may explicitly limit the scope of discovery. See Malin, supra note
33, at 398-99.
35 See AAA EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 31, at 16 (discussing
the parties’ choice of arbitration hearing location as well as the AAA’s discretion to assign
arbitration administration to any of its offices); see also Malin, supra note 33, at 399
(noting that JAMS “provides that . . . the hearing location not place the cost of the
proceeding beyond the employee’s reach”).
36 See AAA EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 31, at 42-43; see also
Malin, supra note 33, at 386 (noting the commonality of employer-imposed arbitration
agreements in prohibiting the arbitration from proceeding as a class action).
37 SeeMalin, supra note 33, at 395 (discussing the employee’s burden of proving
that agreement’s reduced limitations period precludes effective vindication of rights).
38 AAA EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 31, at 28; see Malin,
supra note 33, at 393-94 (noting instances in which an agreement precluded an award
of attorneys’ fees or other remedies to a prevailing employee).
39 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002)
(suggesting that an employee assented to binding arbitration by failing to exercise right
to opt out of the agreement within 30 days).
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makers have focused the bulk of their attention on who wins and
loses in arbitration as compared to litigation, this article argues
that substantive results are important mostly because of the
impact they have on discouraging employees from filing claims
in arbitration at all. Part III then examines how arbitration
clauses deter employees from filing claims by making it more
difficult for them to obtain attorneys, by failing to provide a good
venue for pro se claimants, and by preventing employees from
joining together in class, collective, or even mere group actions.
Part IV, the conclusion, urges Congress to pass the Arbitration
Fairness Act,40 which would prevent employers from imposing
mandatory arbitration, in order to reinvigorate enforcement of our
employment laws.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S SUPPORT FORMANDATORY
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Although the Federal Arbitration Act41 (FAA) was passed
in 1925 to facilitate commercial use of arbitration,42 employers
generally did not seek to mandate employment arbitration for
their non-unionized employees for many decades.43 The Supreme
Court’s 1974 decision in Alexander v. Gardner Denver,44 while
involving a union member, was generally understood to foreclose
employers from mandating arbitration in the non-unionized
workplace as well.45 Indeed, commentators have convincingly
40 See infra Part IV.
41 Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (currently codified at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (2012)).
42 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-
NATIONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION 100-01 (1992); see also IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI,
OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THERISE OFMODERNARBITRATIONLAWS INAMERICA 9-10 (2013).
43 See generally EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n.11 (2002)
(noting that employers began to mandate arbitration in 1990s).
44 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45, 59-60 (1974) (holding that
union member who had arbitrated claim for violation of contract could not be precluded
from subsequently litigating claim for race discrimination, and noting that “the private
litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional
policy against discriminatory employment practices”).
45 SeeMichael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 408 (2000)
(observing that “[b]efore 1991, most parties believed that courts would not enforce
mandatory arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims”); see also Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 728 (1981) (allowing employees to bring
minimum wage claim under FLSA even though they had unsuccessfully submitted wage
claim based on same underlying facts to grievance committee).
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argued that Congress did not intend for the Federal Arbitration
Act to cover employees.46
Today, in contrast, a series of Supreme Court decisions
have enabled employers to require their non-unionized employees
to resolve disputes through arbitration, rather than litigation. As
noted, one frequently cited study states that roughly 20% of
American non-unionized employees,47 or 25 million workers,48 are
covered by arbitration clauses. The Supreme Court’s first decision
opening the floodgates of mandatory employment arbitration was
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.49 In that 1991 decision,
the Court held that a stock exchange member could be compelled
to arbitrate his age discrimination claim against the brokerage.50
While Gilmer was technically not an employment decision, as Mr.
Gilmer was a member rather than an employee of the stock
exchange, the decision nonetheless emboldened employers to begin
to mandate arbitration.51 Subsequently, in Circuit City Stores Inc.
46 Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), states that
“nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
See SZALAI, supra note 42, at 191-92; Matthew Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under the
United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 289-90 (1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment
Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the
Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 263 (1991).
47 Colvin, supra note 8, at 410. Significantly, even if Colvin’s estimate were
substantially too high, and only 10% of American non-unionized employees were
covered by mandatory arbitration provisions, the thrust of the analysis of this Article
would still be valid. Very few employees actually file arbitration claims. See Lipsky et
al., supra note 8, at 142.
48 The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates the size of the U.S. non-farm
workforce as approximately 141 million. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS: CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS—CES (NATIONAL), available at
http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm (last modified Mar. 6, 2015). Subtracting
out the roughly 11% of workers who are unionized, and taking 20% of those who are
not unionized yields 25 million workers.
49 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also
Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 44 (2004) (noting massive
increase in employers’ use of arbitration in 1990s); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher
& Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for
Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (2005) (noting that prior to Gilmer,
“judges, practitioners and academics widely. . .view[ed]” that employment arbitration
agreements would not be enforceable); St. Antoine, supra note 16, at 411-15 (calling
Gilmer “the most significant and most debated ADR decision in labor and employment
law during the past quarter century” and discussing significant growth of mandatory
employment arbitration following its issuance). For discussion of how the Supreme
Court came to embrace mandatory arbitration, see Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 641-42 (1996).
50 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
51 Green, supra note 45, at 408-09; see also Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14
1318 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4
v. Adams,52 the Court expressly held that employers could require
their employees to arbitrate claims against the employer, despite
the seemingly contrary language of Section One of the FAA.53 A few
years later, in EEOC v. Waffle House,54 the Court again addressed
mandatory arbitration of employment claims, holding that
although an employee could be contractually compelled to arbitrate
future claims, they could not waive the EEOC’s power to
investigate employees’ charges of discrimination.55
While the Supreme Court has not directly held that
employers can use arbitration clauses to eliminate employees’
ability to participate in class actions, it has certainly implied
that they may do so, and lower courts have so held. Specifically,
in two recent cases the Court has allowed companies to use
arbitration to prevent consumers or small businesses from
joining together in class actions. First, in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion,56 the Court held that consumers’ attempt to void an
arbitral class action prohibition as unconscionable under
California law was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.57
Subsequently, in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant,58 the Court held that courts should enforce an
arbitral class action prohibition even where that prohibition
realistically prevented the plaintiff small business owners from
enforcing their rights under federal antitrust law.59 In light of
these decisions it seems quite likely that companies will
increasingly use arbitration to block employees from bringing
collective or class claims,60 and that this Supreme Court will
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 52 (1996) (critiquing Gilmer and arguing that employment
arbitration should be knowing and voluntary); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1996) (opposing mandatory employment arbitration in the
wake of Gilmer).
52 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
53 For arguments that Circuit City was wrongly decided, see supra note 46
and accompanying text.
54 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
55 Id. at 295-96.
56 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
57 Id. at 1753.
58 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
59 Id. at 2309 (observing that “[t]he antitrust laws do not ‘evinc[e] an intention to
preclude a waiver’ of class-action procedure” (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (second alteration in original)).
60 As management-side firm, Seyfarth Shaw, puts it, the American Express
decision “ought to help defendants avoid wage and hour class action litigation more
easily for those employers that choose to institute workplace arbitration agreements.”
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, supra note 11, at 3. Another management side report similarly
states “[t]he Supreme Court’s recent decisions in AT&T Mobility and Amex III have
helped to solidify the enforceability of class waivers and clarify the FAA’s controlling
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uphold such efforts by employers.61 While an argument might be
made that collective actions, which require employees to opt in,
are significantly different from the opt-out class actions
addressed in Concepcion and American Express,62 this author is
not optimistic the argument would carry the day with today’s
Supreme Court.63 Certainly a majority of lower courts have
applied the Concepcion and American Express cases to enforce
employers’ arbitration clauses that block employees from joining
together in class actions, collective actions, or even group claims.64
power. As a result, employers can expect a more uniform approach in the lower court’s
enforcement and positive treatment of class waivers.” BAKER HOSTETLER 2013 YEAR-
END REVIEW OF CLASS ACTIONS (ANDWHAT TO EXPECT IN 2014) 7-8 (2014), available at
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/Documents/News/Alerts/Litigation/2014/Class_
Actions_Defense_Year_in_Review_1_17_2014.pdf.
61 See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“Supreme Court precedents inexorably lead to the conclusion that the waiver of
collective action claims is permissible in the FLSA context.”); see also Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int’l
Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 242 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting)) (stating, in dictum, “even
if the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be
granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of
bringing a collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were
intended to be barred” (alteration in original)).
62 See Catherine Fisk, Collective Actions and Joinder of Parties in Arbitration:
Implications ofDRHorton and Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. &LAB. L. 175, 196 (2014).
63 This Court has repeatedly expressed its hostility toward class actions in
arbitration. Besides Concepcion and American Express, see Stolt Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (finding that “a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual
basis for concluding that party agreed to do so”) (emphasis omitted). Sadly, there is no
hint that the Court would treat employment class actions any differently than
consumer class actions, nor that it would treat waivers of FLSA collective actions any
differently than it has treated class actions. See generally David S. Schwartz, Claim-
Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 270 (2012) (critiquing the
Supreme Court majority for “poorly reasoned,” “incoherent” arbitration decisions that
support claim suppression while also critiquing Court’s “liberal wing” for failing to
understand stakes for consumer and employee plaintiffs, and urging Congress to
“intercede to fix the Supreme Court’s horrendous mistakes”).
64 See, e.g., Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1329,
1337 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding arbitral class action prohibition in FLSA claim for
overtime violations); Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 290 (finding, per curiam, that an employee
cannot void an arbitral class action waiver even when that waiver removes financial
incentive to pursue a claim under the FLSA); Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d
483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) (requiring plaintiffs to individually arbitrate putative class action
for gender discrimination, even though plaintiffs alleged they could not bring “pattern
and practice” claim on individual basis); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052
(8th Cir. 2013) (holding that nothing in the text or legislative history of FLSA indicated a
congressional intent to bar employees from agreeing to arbitrate FLSA claims
individually rather than with other class claims); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327
P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014) (holding, in wage and hour class action, that the FAA preempts
California case law which had barred class action waivers as unconscionable); see
generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation
and Arbitration Under the Labor Law, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 164, 170-71 (2013); Iliza
Bershad, Note, Employing Arbitration: FLSA Collective Actions Post-Concepcion, 34
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Also, although for a few months the decision of National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) in D.R. Horton suggested that class
action prohibitions would violate the “concerted activity” provision
of the National Labor Relations Act,65 the Fifth Circuit’s divided
panel reversal of the Board66 and similar decisions from other
courts67 place this decision in jeopardy,68 as does the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, questioning
the status of the NLRB members who issued D.R. Horton.69
In short, the Supreme Court’s current arbitration
jurisprudence not only allows employers to require employees to
resolve disputes in arbitration rather than in litigation, but also
has been interpreted to permit employers to use arbitration to
elude class actions. In decision after decision, lower courts have
required employees to arbitrate rather than litigate their
employment claims, even when the arbitration clause was
contained in a contract of adhesion,70 was written in small print,71
was applied to employees who may not have understood the
clause,72 was not signed,73 eliminated employees’ opportunity to
CARDOZO L. REV. 359, 362-63 (2012) (stating courts have “struggled mightily to determine
the enforcement of arbitration agreements [in] employment contracts” post Concepcion).
65 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012) (finding that home builder D.R.
Horton violated Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act by precluding employees from
joining together in a class action and thereby preventing them from engaging in “concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”).
66 D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing
Board’s decision that class action prohibition rendered clause unenforceable but
affirming decision on other grounds).
67 E.g., Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 297 n.8 (refusing, in footnote dictum, to
follow D.R. Horton); Owen, 702 F.3d at 1053 (refusing to follow D.R. Horton).
68 For further discussion of D.R. Horton, see Fisk, supra note 62, at 177
(observing that NLRB administrative law judges continue to follow the Board decision
and that a newly reconstituted Board may reaffirm its earlier decision).
69 N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, 2014 WL 2882090 (U.S. June 26, 2014)
(holding that President improperly used recess appointment to name members of NLRB).
70 See Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 237 (3d Cir.
2012) (holding employee was bound by arbitration provision contained in forms employer
required to be signed, despite employee having no knowledge of the arbitration provision);
Carson v. Higbee Co., 149 F. App’x 289, 292 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that an employee
assented to an arbitration agreement despite not signing the arbitration acknowledgment
form because, amongst other things, the form stated that continued employment
constituted assent).
71 See e.g., Legair v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 213 F. App’x 436, 439 (6th Cir. 2007)
(stating that arbitration agreements imposed on existing employees are enforceable).
72 See, e.g., Mazera v. Varsity Ford Management Services, LLC, 565 F.3d 997,
1002 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that plaintiff ’s lack of understanding of either English or his
employment contract were not material to the validity of the arbitration agreement).
73 The FAA does not require that an arbitration clause be signed in order to be
valid, but rather only that it be written. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
Thus, courts often enforce arbitration clauses contained in unsigned employee handbooks
or other documents provided to employees. See generally Stone, supra note 51.
2015] DISARMING EMPLOYEES 1321
join together collectively or in a class action,74 was contained in an
expired contract,75 or did not require the employer to arbitrate all
claims against the employee.76 While it is true that courts may
still impose some limits on employers who impose mandatory
arbitration,77 it has become increasingly difficult for employees to
defeat employment arbitration clauses.78 And it is expensive and
time consuming for employees to try to mount such challenges.79
Specific arbitration providers may regulate employers use of
arbitration by refusing to administer clauses that do not meet the
provider’s “due process protocol” or other policies.80 Employers,
however, have the power to select providers that do not propound
such requirements.81 Thus, at this point, employers’ are mainly
constrained by practical factors that may lead them to decide
arbitration is less desirable than litigation, rather than by court
decisions or provider rules.82 Not all employers are yet requiring
74 See supra note 36.
75 Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding
arbitral class action prohibition applied to employees seeking to bring FLSA class
action although contract was expired and contract’s survival clause did not list the
arbitration provision).
76 E.g., Farrow v. Fujitsu America, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05292-LHK, 2014 WL
1396412, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014).
77 Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F. 3d 1204, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 2011)
(refusing to compel plaintiff to arbitrate certain claims on the ground that they did not
fall within the scope of the arbitration clause); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d
1465, 1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that court could enforce a mandatory
employment arbitration provision only if it met various conditions including that it not
require employees to pay unreasonable costs or arbitral fees).
78 See Ambler v. BT Americas Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(enforcing an arbitration agreement between employee and defendant’s predecessor
company despite the company’s later acquisition by defendant and multiple unconscionable
provisions within the agreement); Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1129-30
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that employer Macy’s did not waive any rights under an
arbitration agreement by waiting over two years to move to compel arbitration after the
underlying suit was filed, because superseding case law retroactively rendered the
agreement enforceable); see also Huffman, 747 F.3d 391 at 398-99.
79 See F. Paul Bland, Jr., Is That Arbitration Clause Unconscionable? PROVE
IT!, CONSUMER ADVOC., July-Aug. 2002, at 1.
80 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 294 (2012) (finding that AAA is generally
effective at identifying and responding to companies’ violations of AAA due process
protocols); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
81 The potential for employers and providers to engage in “races to the bottom”
limits the power of voluntary due process protocols to regulate binding arbitration.
82 Employers might, for example, decide that the costs of arbitration are too
high if the courts or arbitration administrator would require the company to pay
substantial arbitrator or administrator fees, that arbitration awards are more difficult to
appeal than court awards, or that employees would be more likely to file a claim in
arbitration than in litigation. And, employers might worry that mandating arbitration
would damage employee morale, hurt the company’s reputation, or lead to expensive legal
battles. See generally Green, supra note 45. However, the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions implying that companies can use arbitration to elude employment class actions
may lead greater numbers of employers to mandate arbitration in the workplace.
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their employees to resolve future disputes through arbitration
rather than through litigation, but as more realize they can use
arbitration to elude the risk of defending against class actions it
seems likely more will do so.83
II. COMPARING RESULTS IN EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AND
LITIGATION
When commentators, critics, and defenders debate the
merits of employment arbitration and litigation, they tend to
focus on how well or poorly employees do when they receive a
hearing in arbitration or litigation. While this information is
relevant, it should not be our exclusive or even primary focus.
First, because very few employees file claims in arbitration,84 the
question of how well or poorly employees do in arbitration is not
as directly significant as one might think. Even assuming for the
sake of argument that employees did quite well in arbitration
(which is not the case), mandatory arbitration would still be
quite harmful if it prevented large numbers of employees from
filing claims at all.85 Second, only a minute percentage of claims
that are filed in litigation are resolved in trial,86 so looking at
trial results has limited value.87 Nonetheless, comparing results
83 See supra notes 9, 60 and accompanying text.
84 See infra Part III.B; see also Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public
in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale
L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2893-2915), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2601132.
85 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses
Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. U. L. REV.
87, 89-90 (2012) (noting that if a villain spread poison killing 99% of the plants on our
planet, we likely would not care too much that the 1% of the plants that survived were
thriving) [hereinafterMandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses].
86 One study found that 70% of federal employment discrimination cases were
settled, and that just 2.8% of employment discrimination cases went to trial in 2006. Kevin
M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court:
From Bad to Worse? 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 123 (2009). This is a general
phenomenon, not one unique to employment disputes. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing
Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEG. STUDS. 459 (2004). Indeed, trials are more frequent in jobs cases than in
other categories of cases. Clermont & Schwab, supra at 123 (stating that in 2006, whereas
2.8% of employment cases went to trial, just 1% of other cases went to trial).
87 Yet, it is also true that one would expect the size of settlements to generally
track the results at trial or hearing. Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEG. STUDS. 225 (1982). Just as
employee win rates and amounts won are lower in arbitration than in litigation, so too
are settlement amounts. COLVIN&GOUGH, COMPARINGMANDATORY ARBITRATION, supra
note 31, at 24 (reporting on survey of plaintiff-side attorneys showing that 29% of
employment arbitration settlements “were between $1 and $25,000” compared to 15%
and 18% in federal and state court respectively, and that 23% of mandatory arbitration
settlements exceeded $100,000 compared to 43% and 38% of settlements in federal and
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in litigation and arbitration is important because it impacts
whether claims will be brought in arbitration at all.88 If employees
or their attorneys believe that they will do poorly in arbitration
they are not likely to bring claims in that forum.
It is somewhat difficult to assess how well or poorly
employees do in mandatory arbitration relative to litigation. As
many frustrated empirical scholars have noted, it is very hard to
obtain data regarding claims brought in either litigation or
arbitration, and even when data is obtained, it is very hard to
know how to compare the two sets of information.89 Arbitration
data is difficult to acquire because arbitration is private.90
Arbitration providers do not need to open their files to researchers
and most have not.91 When arbitration providers do provide access
state court); see also Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of
Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 144-
45 (2007) (reporting on 455 confidential employment discrimination settlements secured
by federal magistrates in Chicago between 1999 and 2005 and finding median settlement
award of $30,000, that 2% of cases yielded settlements exceeding $300,000, and that 7%
of cases resulted in plaintiff receiving less than $5,000); Laura Beth Nielsen et al.,
Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination
Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUDS. 175, 181, 187
(2010) (reporting on range of employment civil rights settlements from 1988–2003, and
noting that the sample includes one settlement for $110 million, one for $29 million, and
one for $8.1 million). Admittedly this disparity could also reflect high process costs in
litigation relative to arbitration.
88 Employment arbitration claims do make it to hearing more frequently than
such claims make it to trial. For example, approximately 27% of compulsory
employment arbitration claims resolved by AAA in 2008 made it to hearing. Colvin &
Pike, supra note 7 at 71. Just 2.8% of federal employment discrimination cases made it
to trial in 2006. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 86, at 123.
89 Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 49, at 45 (emphasizing that arbitrators and
courts process different cases and also process those cases differently); Alexander J.S.
Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes,
8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUDS. 1, 6 (2011) [hereinafter An Empirical Study] (discussing
“apples and oranges” problem); Sherwyn et al., supra note 49, at 1564-66 (examining
difficulties in comparing results of litigated and arbitrated cases).
90 E.g., Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Combating Structural Bias in Dispute System
Designs that Use Arbitration: Transparency, The Universal Sanitizer, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 32, 42-43 (2014) (complaining about difficulty obtaining information regarding
mandatory employment and consumer arbitration programs); Colvin, An Empirical Study,
supra note 89, at 2 (noting lack of publicly available data on arbitration and fact that “[m]ost
empirical research has had to rely on cases of files for which individual arbitration service
provider organizations have provided access,” as well as fact that data sets provided “tend[ ]
to be relatively small in size and potentially lacking representativeness of the broader
population of arbitration cases”); see also Colvin, supra note 8, at 446-47 (noting that private
providers may not be willing to open files to researchers, and that such limits may cause
researchers “to follow the trail from one best case scenario to another while missing the
darker cases that are hidden from public scrutiny”).
91 Virtually all empirical studies on arbitration draw on information provided
by the AAA. See Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 2 (noting that
“[a]lthough the AAA is arguably the leading and largest player in the arbitration field,
it also may be somewhat unrepresentative in its willingness to sign onto and monitor
compliance with due process protocols on arbitration”).
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to researchers, one can never be sure if the particular provider
skewed the data, much less whether one provider’s data or one
kind of employment arbitration can appropriately be generalized
to other providers and other contexts.92 For example, researchers
have observed that early studies of employment arbitration focused
on claims brought by executives who negotiated arbitration clauses
voluntarily, and results in these kinds of cases may not predict
results for lower level employees covered by mandatory arbitration
programs.93 Although California adopted legislation requiring
arbitration providers to report on arbitration outcomes around the
country,94 researchers have complained about providers’ degree of
compliance and have found the data very difficult to analyze.95
Litigation data is somewhat easier to acquire because
litigation is accessible to the public.96 The federal courts in
particular do quite a good job of collecting data.97 By contrast,
state court data is far harder to access because each state follows
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., id. at 5 (observing that early studies of arbitration results tended
to include not only employer-promulgated arbitration plans but also cases based on
individually negotiated arbitration clauses, in which employees tend to have greater
success). Such early studies included Lisa B. Bingham, An Overview of Employment
Arbitration in the United States: Law, Public Policy and Data, 23 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 5,
11 (1998); see alsoMaltby, supra note 16 at 30.
94 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2015).
95 DAVID J. JUNG ET AL., REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION DATA IN
CALIFORNIA: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 1281.96 1-2 (2013), available at http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration-report/2014-
arbitration-update (finding substantial deficiencies in arbitration providers’ compliance
with disclosure requirements and also finding information provided is quite difficult to
use); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 843, 869 (2008)
(complaining about difficulties using California data).
96 See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
(holding a Virginia trial court violated the First Amendment by closing a criminal trial
to the public); Delaware Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013)
(holding that business dispute arbitrations established by Delaware law and
implemented by the Delaware Chancery Court must be open to the public).
97 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts annually publishes a
report regarding cases handled by the federal courts. See Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/AdministrativeOffice.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
However, even federal court statisticians do not collect all the information one might
want. For example, whereas the annual report filed by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts used to contain a table counting the number of class actions filed each year,
this table ceased to be included in the annual report commencing in 2005. See TABLE X-5:
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CLASS ACTION CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER
30, 2004 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/
2004/appendices/x5.pdf [hereinafter TABLEX-5].
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its own practices regarding data collection.98 While, in general,
most civil claims are resolved in state rather than federal court,99
we do not know what proportion of employment claims are
resolved in federal as opposed to state court, and this ratio likely
differs substantially from state to state and over time.100
Gathering arbitration and litigation data is difficult, but
the problem of comparing data between the two fora is even
more daunting. First, the claims that are brought to arbitration
may well differ from those brought to litigation. Second, it is
likely that the process leading up to a hearing differs between
arbitration and litigation. Some have suggested that summary
judgments are far more common in litigation, and that weaker
claims may be weeded out more frequently in litigation than in
arbitration.101 Differences between settlement practices in
arbitration and litigation may also affect the relative success
rates in arbitration and litigation.102
Despite these hurdles, empiricist Alexander Colvin has
recently made a compelling case that employees do substantially
worse in mandatory arbitration than in litigation.103 Based on
examination of files provided by the American Arbitration
Association (AAA),104 disclosures made by providers pursuant to
California law,105 a survey of plaintiff-side employment lawyers
conducted by researcher Mark Gough,106 and empirical work on
98 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 86, at 119 n.49 (complaining about lack of
good state court data but also asserting that whereas employment discrimination
filings in federal court are falling, those in state court appear to be remaining steady).
99 See generally R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2012), available at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%
20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx (stating that over a million cases are filed in state court each
year). By contrast, a little over a quarter of a million cases are filed annually in federal
courts. TABLE C-2A, supra note 29.
100 This author was unsuccessful in collecting state court employment data.
101 See Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should
Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 296 (2012).
102 Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 6 (observing that differences in
settlement practices may either depress or increase the arbitration win rate relative to
litigation); see also David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE
DAMEL. REV. 1247, 1292-93 (2009) (discussing impact of settlements on relative win rates).
103 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice
in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014) (finding mandatory
arbitration exacerbates inequality in access to justice).
104 Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 4 (basing study on AAA
California filings from January 1, 2003 through December 21, 2007, a total of 3,945
employment arbitration cases from across the country).
105 Id.
106 See Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and
Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2014).
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litigation done by other researchers,107 Colvin has found that
employees win far less frequently and are awarded far less money
in arbitration than in litigation.108 In particular, with respect to
win rates Colvin found that employees’win rate was 21.4% in AAA
arbitration,109 36.4% in federal court employment discrimination
cases,110 57% in state court non-civil rights cases,111 and 59% in
California state court common law discharge claims.112
Professor Colvin also discovered that employees win
much less money in arbitration than in litigation. He found
median damages, when damages were awarded, of $36,500 in
AAA arbitration, $176,426 in federal court employment
discrimination cases, $85,560 in state court non-civil rights
employment cases, and $355,843 in California state court
common law discharge cases.113 Comparing mean damages,
including those in which plaintiff recovered nothing, Colvin
found a recovery of $109,858 in AAA arbitration, $394,223 in
federal court employment discrimination cases, and $575,453
in state court non-civil rights employment cases.114 While some
107 See Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 4-5 (citing, e.g.,
Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 49, at 44-45; David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts
Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful
Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 511, 514, 535 (2003)).
108 See Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 5 (comparing data from
AAA arbitrations, federal court employment discrimination cases, and state court non-
civil rights claims and finding that win rates, median and mean recovery were all much
lower in arbitration than in litigation); Gough, supra note 106, at 91 (drawing on
survey of plaintiff-side employment attorneys to find that higher employee win rates
and recoveries in arbitration than in litigation cannot be explained by systematic
differences in caseloads between the arbitral and litigation fora).
109 Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 5 (defining “win” to include “any
case in which some award of damages, however small, is made in favor of the employee”).
110 Id. (citing Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 49, at 46 (relying on data provided
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for 1979-2000)); see also Clermont &
Schwab, supra note 86, at 129 (finding federal employment discrimination plaintiffs
won 28.47% of trials based on data provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts from 1979 through 2006); Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical
Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their
Rights?, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 56, 57 (reporting 33.6% employee win
rates in claims brought in the S.D.N.Y.); Nielsen et al., supra note 87, at 186-88
(finding in study of sample employment discrimination claims brought in federal court
from 1998–2003 that plaintiffs settled 58% of cases and prevailed in one-third of the
6% of cases that went to trial).
111 Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 5 (citing Eisenberg & Hill,
supra note 49). The Oppenheimer study looked at “every California verdict in a
common law wrongful discharge or statutory employment discrimination case reported
in 1998 or 1999 in one or more of the three major California jury verdict reporters.”
Oppenheimer, supra note 107, at 532.
112 Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 5.
113 Id. (converting damages to 2005 dollars).
114 Id. (again converting to 2005 dollars).
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of this difference may be attributable to the fact that disputes
generally proceed to hearing more quickly in arbitration than
litigation,115 thereby lessening employees’ entitlement to back
pay, not all employment claims involve back pay and this
difference cannot explain the stark disparities found by Colvin.
Some scholars have suggested that, even if employees’
success rate or recovery is lower in arbitration than litigation,
these results may reflect the supposed fact that lower income
employees use arbitration rather than litigation,116 or that
weaker cases are weeded out by summary judgment in litigation
but not in arbitration.117 However, a recent study by researcher
Mark Gough undercuts both of these rationales. In an effort to
solve the “apples and oranges” challenge, Gough surveyed plaintiff-
side employment attorneys as to their most recent cases in both
arbitration and litigation.118 Gough found that whereas 62% of
cases handled by attorneys in arbitration involved employees
making less than $100,000 per year, 85% of cases handled by
attorneys in litigation involved employees making less than
$100,000.119 That is, the employees in arbitration were actually
better paid than those in litigation, and therefore one would
expect them to recover more, not less, in their hearings.120
Similarly, Gough found that summary judgment was far more
common in arbitration than many have assumed, and that
“motions for summary judgment were filed in over half of all
arbitration proceedings.”121 Thus, plaintiffs’ inferior results in
employment arbitration cannot be entirely attributed to greater
use of summary judgment in litigation than in arbitration.
115 Id. at 8 (finding that AAA employment arbitrations were heard in about a
year whereas litigated employment disputes took about two years to get to trial).
116 Malin, supra note 101, at 295 (contending lower income employees can be
expected to recover less).
117 Id. at 291-96; Sherwyn et al., supra note 49, at 1566 (noting purported rarity
of summary judgment in arbitration); see also St. Antoine, supra note 16, at 418-20
(recognizing difficulty of conducting good empirical studies in this area but concluding
that employment claimants “generally fare about as well (or better) in arbitration as in
court,” although “extremely large awards are more common in litigation”).
118 See generally Gough, supra note 106.
119 Id. at 109.
120 Id. This finding also casts substantial doubt on the premise that
arbitration is more accessible to lower paid workers than is litigation.
121 Id. at 108.
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III. MANDATORY EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATIONHARMS
EMPLOYEES BY SUPPRESSING THEIR CLAIMS
Some commentators have argued that even assuming
employees win more frequently and win more money in litigation
than in arbitration, arbitration is nonetheless the superior forum
because it is quicker, cheaper, more informal, and more accessible
to employees. The best known of these pieces is Professor Samuel
Estreicher’s article, “Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the
Debate Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements.”122
In an era when a “Saturn” was a reasonably priced no-frills car,
Estreicher analogized a Saturn to arbitration. Specifically, he
argued that it was better to provide a Saturn (arbitration) to all
workers than to provide a Cadillac (litigation) to just a few
fortunate employees and mere rickshaws to the rest.123 He urged
that “[a] properly designed arbitration system . . . can do a better
job of delivering accessible justice for average claimants than a
litigation-based approach.”124
The argument seems plausible. Most employees, like
most potential claimants of all sorts, lack the realistic ability to
bring claims in court.125 Few employees have the resources to
122 Drahozal, supra note 16, at 840 (2008) (“The empirical evidence suggests
that arbitration may be a more accessible forum than courts for lower income
employees . . . .”); Estreicher, supra note 16; see also Sherwyn et al., supra note 16, at
99 (arguing that arbitration is “more accessible to employees” because it is faster); St.
Antoine, supra note 16, at 417-18 (2010) (suggesting arbitration is more accessible to
lower paid workers than litigation). For a recent critique and update on Estreicher’s
piece, see generally Colvin & Pike, supra note 7.
123 Estreicher, supra note 16, at 563 (urging that “[t]he people who benefit
under a litigation-based system are those whose salaries are high enough to warrant
the costs and risks of a law suit undertaken by competent counsel” but that “[v]ery few
claimants, however, are able to obtain a position in this ‘litigation lottery’”).
124 Id. Estreicher suggested that while the litigation system is not generally
good for employees it is valued by plaintiffs’ employment counsel “because it enables them
to be highly selective about the cases they take on.” Id. Estreicher echoed many themes
that had been expressed earlier by Lewis Maltby, a self-proclaimed employee advocate.
Like Estreicher, Maltby asserted that “[m]any people with legitimate claims against their
employers never receive justice because they are unable to afford a lawyer.” Maltby,
supra note 16, at 30. Maltby urged that because mediation and arbitration are “generally
much less expensive than litigation . . . [these processes may] bring justice within the
reach of many to whom it is currently denied.” Id. However, while suggesting that
advocates for employees be open to the possible benefits of voluntary and regulated
arbitration, Maltby rejected employers’ imposition of arbitration as a condition of
employment. Id. at 34; see also Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace
Justice, 38 U. S. F. L. REV. 105, 117 (2003) (suggesting that twice as many employees
could afford to arbitrate rather than litigate their claims).
125 See, e.g., Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon:
What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.
J. 37, 38 (2010) (urging that programs to assist self-representation and to provide
counsel all be considered part of a larger endeavor to enhance access to justice); see also
Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 90 (2004)
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pay an attorney an hourly fee, and few employees’ claims are
large enough for an attorney to be willing to take the claim on a
contingent fee basis.126 Yet, while a theoretical argument can be
made that mandatory employment arbitration might be more
accessible to employees than litigation,127 the following sections
show that arbitration worsens rather than ameliorates employees’
access to justice.
A. Counting Employment Claims in Arbitration
Given that roughly 20% of the non-unionized workforce is
covered by arbitration clauses,128 if imposing mandatory arbitration
enhances employees’ access to justice we would expect to see lots of
employees bringing claims in arbitration. Very few employees,
however, bring claims in arbitration, paralleling the Consumer
Financial Protection Board finding that very few consumers bring
claims in arbitration.129 Researcher Alexander Colvin found that
although the American Arbitration Association handles roughly
50% of employment arbitration claims that are filed,130 in 2008 it
received only 946 claims involving employees.131 And roughly 10%
(asserting that few individuals who are neither wealthy nor assisted by public interest
organizations can obtain access to litigation).
126 See infra text accompanying notes 152-153; see also Malin, supra note 101,
at 292 (discussing difficulties many employees face in securing legal representation);
GARY BLASI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, UCLA LAW/RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUBLIC POLICY,
CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT: THE FAIR
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT AT 50 36 [hereinafter CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT]
(finding California plaintiff-side employment attorneys take approximately 10% of
cases in which representation is sought, but that elite firms rejected more than 95% of
potential clients); Maltby, supra note 16, at 58 (citing plaintiff-side employment
attorneys’ estimates that only 5% or less of employees who seek representation are able
to obtain it).
127 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
129 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY:
REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A), Section 5 p. 9 (Mar. 2015), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/reports/arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015/ (click
“Full Report”) (reporting that from 2010-2012 just 1,847 consumer financial product
claims were filed with AAA, of which 613 were claims filed by the company or jointly by
company and consumer).
130 COMPARINGMANDATORY ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at 35. The study found
that JAMS handled 20% of the claims and that the remaining 30% of claims were split
among ad hoc processes (no provider) and miscellaneous smaller providers. Id.
131 Colvin & Pike, supra note 7, at 81. Colvin’s study looked at internal AAA
files to compile these numbers, going beyond information made publicly available due
to California disclosure requirements. Id. at 61. Of these 946 claims, 449 were resolved
following a hearing, with the rest being settled or withdrawn. See id. at 61, 82; see also
Lipsky et al, supra note 8 at 143-44 (drawing from a variety of sources to find that the
largest arbitration providers—AAA, JAMS, and FINRA—together handle at most a
couple thousand arbitration claims each year). Notably, some of the claims counted by
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of those claims were brought by employers against employees
rather than employees against employers.132 In an earlier study
Colvin had similarly found that between 2003 and 2007, AAA
handled just 3,945 employment cases arising out of employer
promulgated plans, making for less than 1,000 filings per year.133
Thus, if AAA handles 50% of claims and it handles less than a
thousand claims per year, it seems that fewer than two thousand
non-unionized employees are filing arbitration claims each year.
A system in which fewer than two thousand employees file
employment arbitration claims per year does not provide
substantial access to justice. On its face, two thousand is a small
number, but it is also important to put this number in context.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the size of the United
States non-farm workforce is roughly 141 million.134 Subtracting
out the 11% of these employees who are unionized and using the
estimate that roughly 20% of the non-unionized employees in the
country are covered by arbitration clauses,135 we can estimate that
25 million non-unionized employees are governed by arbitration
clauses. Doing the math we can see that only .008% of covered
employees, or one of every twelve thousand employees are filing
an employment claim in arbitration each year.
Some might argue that few employees file arbitration
claims because they simply do not have claims to file, however, we
Professor Lipsky and his co-authors are voluntary or post-dispute arbitrations and
some are claims by employers against employees, again confirming the point that very
few employees covered by mandatory arbitration clauses file claims against their
employer. Based on information obtained anecdotally, and based on review of reported
cases, it seems that employers are far more likely to impose mandatory arbitration on
their blue collar or lower level employees than on senior management, with whom they
might use voluntary arbitration. See id. at 141.
132 Colvin found that of the 449 cases that went to hearing, 72.4% arose out of
employer-promulgated plans and 27.6% arose from individually negotiated arbitration
clauses. Colvin & Pike, supra note 7, at 65. Among the claims arising from employer
promulgated plans, 8.6% involved claims by employer plaintiffs, and 16.1% of the claims
arising from individually negotiated clauses involved employer plaintiffs. Id. at 66.
133 Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 4 (drawing from AAA
filings). David Lipsky and his co-authors have also found that the number of claims
that employees take to arbitration is quite small, and that the number of arbitration
awards issued each year is even significantly smaller. Lipsky et al, supra note 8, at
142-44. “It therefore appears that in a typical year the most important ADR providers
(AAA, JAMS, and FINRA) administer no more than 500 employment arbitration cases
that result in an award.” Id. at 144.
134 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics—CES,
(National), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2015), http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm.
135 See supra note 8. Cf. David Lewin, Employee Voice and Mutual Gains, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 427, 431 (Adrian
Wilkinson et al. eds., 2010) (reporting that 63% of surveyed non-union publicly traded
companies imposed employment ADR, and that 70% of these ADR programs included
arbitration, so that 44% of the surveyed companies were imposing arbitration).
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know this is not true. Although, as noted, the litigation system is
not particularly accessible to many employees,136 over the past
five years roughly 30,000 employees have filed employment civil
rights, Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), or Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) claims in federal court
alone on an annual basis.137 This figure does not even include
other categories of employment claims, such as breach of contract
or the employment claims filed in state courts.138 It is also
important to consider that some of the claims filed in court would
be class actions, likely covering hundreds, thousands, or even
greater numbers of employees.139 From 2007 through 2011 an
average of 560 employment class actions were filed in federal
courts alone.140
Drawing on all of this data, one can make at least a very
rough estimate of how many employment claims are filed in court.
We have seen that 30,000 employment civil rights, FLSA, and
ERISA claims are filed annually in federal court, of which roughly
560 were class actions.141 Estimating, conservatively, that each
class contains 500 members, this means that the 80% of the
workforce not covered by arbitration clauses files roughly 300,000
claims in federal court alone each year. Even ignoring state court
claims altogether, we would expect the 20% of the workforce
covered by arbitration clauses to file at least 75,000 claims. Or,
even ignoring the class action factor as well as state court actions
we would expect at least 7,500 arbitration claims. Instead, we
have seen that the 20% of the workforce covered by arbitration
clauses files just two thousand arbitration claims each year.
Clearly this is a very, very small number.
136 See supra Part III.A.
137 See TABLE C-2A, supra note 29.
138 One study of employment discrimination claims in California found that of
400 administrative complaints in which “right to sue letter[s]” were issued within a week
of filing the administrative complaint, 176 filed a complaint in state court and just one
filed a complaint in federal court. CENTER FOR LAW & PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 126, at
11. However, this ratio no doubt varies substantially by state and over time.
139 See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
140 According to civil terminations data obtained from the Federal Court Cases
Integrated Data Base and analyzed by researcher Mark Gough, in this five-year time frame
employees filed an average of 347 FLSA class actions, 110 ERISA class actions, and 89 ADA
or other civil rights class actions. E-mail fromMark Gough, Ph.D. Candidate, Cornell Univ.,
to author (June 18, 2014, 9:23AM) [hereinafter E-mail from Gough to Sternlight] (on file
with author). Similarly, data published by the Administrative Office of U.S. courts shows
that in 2003 and 2004 an average of roughly 85 employment class action suits, 115 FLSA
class actions, and 100 ERISA class actions were filed annually in federal court, for a total of
300 employment-related class actions. See TABLE X-5, supra note 97. Unfortunately, the
Administrative Office no longer publishes the chart showing the number of employment
class actions filed in federal court.
141 See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
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Another piece of empirical evidence regarding whether
employees have claims they would like to file against their
employers is the fact that in every year between 1997 and 2013,
the EEOC has received at least 75,000 charges of discrimination
and sometimes as many as 99,947 in one year.142 We also know
that additional employees file administrative claims of employment
discrimination with state agencies143 and that many employees
may have employment claims that are not founded on alleged
discrimination. Of course the number of employees who file claims
administratively, in court or in arbitration, is also an undercount of
those employees who actually feel they have been aggrieved. The
social science literature on the “dispute pyramid” of “claiming”
shows that a significant number of employees who feel aggrieved
by an employer’s action do not go on to file a claim against that
employer.144 Ideally arbitration might offer a hospitable forum to
some of those potential claimants, but the low numbers of
arbitration filings make it clear that this is not happening.
In short, it is not true that mandatory employment
arbitration affords employees increased access to justice. Rather,
it seems that the imposition of mandatory arbitration is actually
suppressing the claims of employees. The fifth of the workplace
covered by mandatory arbitration provisions is filing a miniscule
number of claims in arbitration, whether one compares the
number of claims to those that might have been litigated or to
those that were filed administratively.
142 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2014, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2015).
143 A study of employment discrimination claims in California found that “[f]or
every 1 million employees in California, about 1,000 administrative employment
discrimination complaints are filed each year,” and that employees filed three times as
many claims with the state agency as they did with the EEOC, although many employees
file with both agencies. CALIFORNIAEMPLOYMENT, supra note 126 at 11. The complaint rate
in California was found to be comparable to that of several other large states. Id. at 26.
144 E.g., Alexander & Prasad, supra note 3 at 1073 (reporting that 43% of low-
wage workers who were aware they had experienced an employment problem decided
not to make any kind of complaint); Brenda Major & Cheryl Kaiser, Perceiving and
Claiming Discrimination, in OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND
REALITIES (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, eds., 2005); see also Herbert K.
Kritzer et al., To Confront Or Not To Confront: Measuring Claiming Rates In
Discrimination Grievances, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 875, 880-82 (1991) (finding “claiming”
rate of 57% in employment “conditions/salary” disputes); Richard E. Miller & Austin
Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 525, 539-40 (1980) (finding claiming rate of 29% in discrimination disputes).
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B. How Does Mandatory Employment Arbitration Suppress
Claims?
How does mandatory employment arbitration suppress
rather than encourage claims? Why do employees not flock to what
is supposed to be an inexpensive, fair, speedy, informal forum for
presenting their claims? To understand this phenomenon one must
consider both the legal nature and the economics of employment
claims. Specifically, this section examines the impact of mandatory
arbitration on employees’ ability to secure legal representation, on
their willingness to bring claims pro se, and on their ability to
participate in class actions, collective claims, or group actions.
The matters discussed in this section can be understood
through claims that might be raised by two hypothetical
workers, Mark and Lucinda. Mark works as a server at a chain
restaurant, Bananabees. He is paid less than minimum wage
but does receive tips. His median weekly salary including tips,
for a 40-hour week, is $449, making for an annual salary of
$23,348 and an hourly wage of $11.22.145 Bananabees, however,
requires Mark and other servers to spend a substantial amount
of time performing duties for which they are not compensated.146
For example, he and the others must report to work a half an
hour ahead of the official beginning of their shift and also stay at
least a half an hour after the shift ends to perform tasks,
including cleaning the store, washing dishes, and stocking food
supplies.147 Lucinda is a security guard for Protection Inc., a
company with 21,000 employees throughout the United States.
She has repeatedly applied for a promotion to a supervisory
position but has always been denied. She earns $500 per week,
and an annual salary of $26,000.148 The supervisory position she
seeks would pay $35,000 per year. Lucinda, who is Mexican-
American, believes she is being discriminated against on the
basis of gender and ethnicity. The company president, Joe Jerk,
has made ethnic slurs and sexist comments in meetings and at
parties on occasion. The discrimination to which Lucinda
145 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey: Median Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers by
Detailed Occupation and Sex, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.htm
(last modified Feb. 12, 2015).
146 One recent study showed that a substantial number of workers are denied
legal protection to which they are entitled under statutes such as the FLSA. See
BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 4.
147 This hypothetical is loosely based on Porreca v. Rose Grp., 2013 WL
6498392 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2013).
148 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 145.
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believes she has been subjected has upset her greatly and she is
suffering mentally and physically as a result of her belief that
she has been discriminatorily denied a promotion.
1. Securing Attorney Representation
When employees believe they have been treated improperly
in the workplace they may seek to resolve issues on their own or
with the help of internal company resources, but if their initial
efforts are unsuccessful they will at times reach out for legal
assistance.149 Yet, given the economics of how plaintiff-side
employment attorneys are compensated, when employers impose
mandatory arbitration clauses they may make it more difficult for
employees to secure legal representation. Most plaintiff-side
employment attorneys in the United States represent the bulk of
their clients on a partially or entirely contingent fee basis.150
While some employees may obtain free representation from
advocacy organizations, such organizations are not sufficiently
well-funded to handle the claims of most employees.151 Very few
employees have the resources to pay an attorney an hourly fee,152
149 Of course, employees very often choose not to seek legal assistance, for a
variety of reasons including lack of time, lack of resources, or fear of adverse emotional
or employment consequences. See supra note 146 and accompanying text; see also
Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of Wage
Litigation and its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 366
(2013) (stating that aggrieved workers “are left with a bleak choice: stay quiet and
forego needed wages, try to find a private attorney willing to litigate a modest
individual claim or complex class claim, or wait for one’s wage claim at a government
agency that might never be answered”).
150 See COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at 12 (reporting
survey of 1,256 plaintiff-side employment attorneys showing that while their average
hourly rate was $398 per hour, 75% of the attorneys usually represented employees on
a contingency fee basis, 17% usually represented employees under a contingency fee
hybrid including upfront costs or reduced hourly fees, and 6% usually charged hourly
fees); see also Sherwyn et al., supra note 16, at 89 (noting that because few employees
can afford attorneys’ hourly rates, most aggrieved employees seek to retain an attorney
on a contingency basis).
151 Ruan, supra note 24, at 1115. Ruan also notes that federally funded Legal
Services Corporation offices are proscribed from representing undocumented workers,
who make up a significant number of the low-wage workers in the United States. Id.
See generally RUBEN L. GARCIA, MARGINAL WORKERS: HOW LEGAL FAULT LINES DIVIDE
WORKERS AND LEAVE THEMWITHOUT PROTECTION (2012).
152 This is not surprising given the $398 average hourly fee found by Colvin &
Gough. See supra note 31, at 12.); see also Green, Finding Lawyers, supra note 23, at 64
(asserting that “most employees pursuing employment discrimination claims . . . face
little hope of finding an attorney [in that] only about five percent of those pursuing
employment discrimination claims find attorneys to represent them in court”); William
M. Howard, Ph.D, J.D., Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really
Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40, 44
(reporting on survey of plaintiffs’ counsel showing that plaintiffs’ counsel accepted only
5% of the employment discrimination claims brought to them by prospective clients, and
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particularly if they have just lost their job.153 Thus, when
employees seek legal representation the attorneys they consult
must typically decide whether they can afford to handle the case
on a contingent fee basis.
To make the calculation of whether a case is worth
taking on a contingent fee basis, plaintiff-side lawyers will
generally do a cost-benefit analysis.154 On the benefit side the
attorney will consider the expected value of taking the case, such
as the odds of getting a settlement or prevailing in adjudication,
and also the size of the expected settlement or likely adjudicated
outcome by judge or jury, including any awarded attorney fees.155
Then the attorneys will also consider the costs of getting a
settlement or judgment in both dollars and time. Plaintiff-side
employment attorneys typically advance to their clients such
costs as filing fees, deposition fees, and payments to expert
witnesses.156 Plaintiff-side attorneys will sometimes advance
costs of arbitration—both the arbitration filing fee and the
arbitrators’ hourly or daily fees.157 When attorneys are required
to advance arbitral fees the cost can easily be thousands of
dollars, depending on the value and complexity of the case and
the credentials of the arbitrator or arbitrators.158 Claims that are
that they looked for cases in which the clients demonstrated provable damages of at least
$60,000); see also supra note 127.
153 Maltby, supra note 16, at 57 (“It is nearly impossible for a worker to raise
thousands of dollars for an attorney when she is struggling to support herself and his
dependents without an income.”).
154 See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS:
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THEUNITED STATES (2004).
155 See Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 16, at
89-94 (discussing how plaintiff-side attorneys decide which cases to take, albeit
recognizing that opinions are not founded on empirical studies). With regard to the
possibility of recovering attorney fees in some employment cases see generally Jean R.
Sternlight, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees to Prevailing
Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1990).
156 Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 16, at 93
(stating “[i]t is one thing to work for free; paying to work is another matter”); see also
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 270 (1998) (discussing practice of advancing costs to clients).
157 Christopher Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59
VAND. L. REV. 729, 760 (2006) (arguing that because contingent fee attorneys often
front arbitration costs for their clients, “the contingent fee system provides a means for
overcoming possible liquidity and risk aversion barriers to arbitration”). While it seems
that the employer generally pays arbitrators’ fees, see COMPARING MANDATORY
ARBITRATION, supra note 31 at 35 (reporting that survey of plaintiff-side employment
attorneys showed that the employer paid 100% of arbitrator fees in 82% of cases), the
need to advance such costs in some cases no doubt affects attorneys’ willingness to take
cases on a contingent fee basis.
158 Drahozal, supra note 157, at 738-39; see also Morrison v. Circuit City
Stores, 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (requiring case-by-case analysis as to whether cost-
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more legally or factually complex, perhaps requiring statistical
proof or substantial expert testimony, are more challenging to
bring from an economic standpoint.
In light of this cost-benefit analysis plaintiff-side
employment attorneys often refuse to take cases offered to them.
One oft-cited survey found in 1995 that plaintiff-side employment
attorneys typically would not take such cases unless the plaintiff
could show a minimum of $60,000 in damages, excluding
consequential or punitive damages,159 and that plaintiff-side
employment attorneys only accepted between 5% and 10% of the
case offered to them.160 Two more recent studies similarly found
that plaintiff-side employment attorneys would look for potential
settlement value or total damages of approximately $60,000.161
One recent study found the median attorney would take 10% of
the employees who sought representation in litigation.162 While
the exact numbers likely differ substantially depending on the
attorney and the context, one implication of these economics is
that higher paid employees are typically far more able to secure
legal representation than lower paid employees because their
back pay losses will be greater.163
Let us consider how a plaintiff-side attorney might decide
whether to represent our hypothetical plaintiff Mark, the server
at Bananabees who complains he is required to work an extra
uncompensated hour per day. At Mark’s hourly rate of $11.23,
and assuming a five day work week and 50 weeks of work per year,
this converts to a wage loss of roughly $2,800 per year. Even
assuming a six year statute of limitations,164 and that Mark could
recover time and a half for his wage loss,165 the $25,200 maximally
splitting requirement in employment arbitration clause should be upheld and noting
average arbitrator fee was $700 per day).
159 Howard, supra note 152, at 40, 44-45.
160 See supra note 128. Cf. KRITZER, RISKS, supra note 154, at 71 (2004)
(reporting that contingent fee attorneys more generally take a much higher percentage
of cases, in the order of 50%).
161 COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at 13; CALIFORNIA
EMPLOYMENT, supra note 126, at 36 (finding median plaintiff-side employment
attorney required $50,000 in damages before accepting case, while noting that elite
firms accepted cases only if expected recovery exceeded $250,000).
162 COMPARINGMANDATORYARBITRATION, supra note 31, at 14 (reporting that the
median attorney would take just 5% of cases that included arbitration clause). The mean
acceptance rates were somewhat higher—19% in litigation and 11% in arbitration. Id.
163 Higher paid employees are more able to obtain attorneys both because
their salary loss will be greater and because they are more likely to have at least some
savings they could put towards legal bills. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 49, at 47.
164 See, e.g., Mascol v. E & L Transp., Inc., No CV-03-3343 CPS, 2005 WL
1541045 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005) (discussing six year statute of limitations for wage
claims in New York).
165 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012).
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at stake in his case likely is not sufficient to tempt many plaintiff-
side employment attorneys.166 Nor is the potential availability of
attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs usually sufficient to tempt
attorneys to take such an individual case, as attorneys realize
that they may not prevail and that even if they do prevail a court
may well not provide them with a substantial award of attorney
fees.167 Thus, even if a plaintiff-side attorney thinks Mark’s claim
is very strong, on the merits, Mark may well not be able to obtain
an attorney on an individual basis. Perhaps, however, he might
stand a chance of obtaining representation as part of a group or
class of employees with similar legal problems.168
Lucinda, the Mexican-American security guard who
believes she was discriminatorily denied a promotion, will likely
also have a tough time obtaining representation. The annual
difference in pay between the position she seeks and the position
she already has is just $9,000. Depending on when the case went
to trial, Lucinda might recover at most $18,000 in back pay, given
the two year statute of limitations,169 but this number could be
lower if the case gets to court or hearing earlier or if Lucinda gets a
pay raise or obtains another position paying more than what she
currently earns.170 Lucinda’s best hope of obtaining representation
may rest on any claim she might have to compensatory or
punitive damages. Such damages are sometimes available in
discrimination cases, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.171 An attorney Lucinda consulted would likely make a careful
166 Cf. Chase v. AIMCO Props. L.P., 374 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 (D.D.C. 2005)
(finding individual wage and hour claims often not sufficient to warrant litigation); Sav-
on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 P.3d 194, 209 (Cal. 2004) (noting that class
action suit was desirable in overtime suit because it “provides small claimants with a
method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant
individual litigation” (quoting Richmond v. Dart Industries Inc., 629 P.2d 23 (1981)).
167 See Sternlight, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees,
supra note 155; see also Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration, supra
note 16, at 93-94 (discussing plaintiff-side employment attorneys’ rational hesitation to
take low damages cases).
168 See infra Part III.C.3.
169 Front pay is also sometimes available as an equitable remedy when
reinstatement is not possible. See Pollard v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S.
843 (2001) (holding front pay not subject to damages cap). But, as Lucinda has not been
terminated she would not be entitled to reinstatement or front pay. See id. (describing
the purpose of front pay awards).
170 Regarding Lucinda’s duty to mitigate her damages, see, e.g., E.E.O.C. v.
Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 670 (8th Cir. 1992) (“A Title VII claimant seeking
either back pay or front pay damages has a duty to mitigate those damages by
exercising reasonable diligence to locate other suitable employment and maintain a
suitable job once it is located.”).
171 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012); see also Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding punitive damages are available under 1991
Act when employer has acted with malice or reckless indifference).
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assessment of whether, given the more detailed facts Lucinda may
report and the law of the particular jurisdiction, she might state a
viable claim to either compensatory172 or punitive damages.173 If
these claims appeared fairly strong an attorney might take the
case, but quite likely many attorneys would conclude that
Lucinda’s provable damages were too low to warrant taking the
case on a contingent fee basis.174
Let us now consider how arbitration impacts the
calculation. If arbitration were quicker and cheaper than litigation
and also offered plaintiffs just as good a chance at recovery as
litigation then plaintiff-side employment attorneys would
presumably flock to arbitration in droves.175 As one set of
commentators states “[h]olding all else constant (the merits,
plaintiff, defendant, and most important, damages), lawyers should
be more likely to accept a Title VII arbitration-bound plaintiff
than a litigation-bound plaintiff.”176 It does seem to be true that
claims proceed more quickly in arbitration than in litigation,
which is a benefit to plaintiffs.177 But if, however, plaintiff-side
employment attorneys have reason to believe that their client’s
chances of recovery will be worse in arbitration than in litigation,
or that their process costs will be higher,178 then the attorneys will
generally be less likely to take a claim that is covered by an
arbitration clause.
In fact, a survey of plaintiff-side employment attorneys
conducted by Alexander Colvin and Mark Gough found that the
presence of an arbitration clause would discourage the attorneys
172 See, e.g., Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1995)
(awarding $267,268.55 for termination on basis of age). Note that even when
compensatory or punitive damages can be proven, they are capped at between $50,000
and $300,000, depending on the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).
173 Punitive damages are rarely held appropriate in employment discrimination
cases. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment
Discrimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735 (2008) (reporting
that of more than 600 employment discrimination cases issued in 2004-2005 just 24
included an award of punitive damages).
174 Howard, supra note 152, at 44. Converting $60,000 in 1995 to current
dollars, the average plaintiff-side attorney today might look for cases with at least
$95,000 in damages. U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com
(last visited June 8, 2014) (drawing on Consumer Price Index calculations).
175 See generally Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration, supra
note 16, at 92-93 (discussing how plaintiff-side employment attorneys select cases).
176 Id. at 100. Recognizing that most plaintiff-side employment attorneys,
nonetheless, oppose arbitration, the authors contend the hostility is due to the supposed
fact that it is harder to settle claims quickly and for high amounts in arbitration than in
litigation. Id. at 99-100.
177 Colvin, An Empirical Study, supra note 89, at 30.
178 See supra note 158.
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from taking the case on a contingent fee basis.179 Specifically, they
found that whereas the surveyed attorneys reported accepting
10% of the potential clients who sought representation in
litigation, they accepted only 5% of potential clients who were
covered by a mandatory arbitration clause.180 While their finding
certainly does not show that the presence or absence of an
arbitration clause is an employment attorney’s most important
consideration, the presence of arbitration is clearly significant,
cutting acceptance rates in half.
Colvin and Gough also considered plaintiff-side
employment attorneys’ subjective attitudes towards mandatory
arbitration and litigation, and found that such attorneys
preferred litigation to mandatory arbitration. Specifically, if an
employee was covered by a mandatory arbitration clause the
attorneys said they would be less willing to take the case, less
willing to invest time and resources in the case, and less willing to
represent the client on a contingent fee basis.181 Along these same
lines Colvin and Gough also found that the attorneys perceived
mandatory arbitration had negative effects on the “adequacy of
discovery, fairness of proceedings, and fairness of outcomes.”182
And, where the attorneys had taken claims to verdict or award,
they were more satisfied with the reasoning of decisions and the
opportunity to present evidence and collect information from the
opposing party in litigation than in arbitration.183
In sum, while an attorney’s feelings about arbitration will
likely vary according to the context of the claim and the parties,184
179 COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at 9 (presenting
results from a fall 2013 survey of 1,256 members of the National Employment Lawyers
Association and the California Employment Lawyers Association, two major professional
associations of plaintiff-side employment attorneys). They found that the presence of such
a provision would lead the attorneys on average to be somewhere between “somewhat
likely to reject for this reason” and “undecided whether to reject for this reason.” Id. at 13.
In the consumer context the National Association of Consumer Advocates performed a
survey of nearly 350 consumer attorneys and similarly found that 84% of the surveyed
attorneys had “rejected a client with a meritorious consumer claim because of an
arbitration clause.” NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, Consumer Attorneys Report:
Arbitration Clauses Are Everywhere, Consequently Causing Consumer Claims to
Disappear, at 5 (June 23, 2012), available at http://www.naca.net/sites/default/files/
NACA2012BMASurveyFinalRedacted_0.pdf.
180 COMPARINGMANDATORY ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at 14.
181 Id. at 16. It should be noted, however, that these scores were not extremely
negative, rather ranging from 2.75 to 2.88 where one meant “very negative” and four
meant “no effect.” Id. The most important factor influencing whether the attorneys
would take a case was their assessment of its strength on the merits. Id.
182 Id. at 17.
183 Id. at 18.
184 In certain situations attorneys may predict that a client might do better in
arbitration than in litigation. For example, highly paid white male executives who are
complaining of being denied a contractual bonus might fare better in front of an
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it is clear that when employers require their employees to pursue
claims in arbitration, rather than litigation, the employers make
it more difficult for their employees to obtain representation.
2. Pro Se Claimants
If arbitration were more hospitable to pro se claimants than
is litigation, perhaps it would not matter that attorneys are more
reluctant to take claims to arbitration than to litigation. Those who
believe arbitration provides greater access to justice than litigation
suggest that because arbitration is supposedly quicker and simpler
than litigation, employees would be more willing and able to bring
claims pro se in arbitration than in litigation.185
Certainly it is true that pro se employees have a difficult
time in litigation. It is hard to file a case in court pro se and even
harder to prevail. One study of the 20% of employment claims
filed in federal court pro se by employees found such pro se
employee plaintiffs were almost three times as likely to have their
lawsuits dismissed, were less likely to obtain an early settlement,
and were twice as likely as represented plaintiffs to lose on
summary judgment.186
However, while the proposition that unrepresented
employees might do better in arbitration than in litigation again
seems plausible, available data suggests it is not true. As we have
seen, very few employees, represented or not, file claims in
arbitration. Also, data collected by Alexander Colvin from the
AAA showed that only 31.4% of employee claimants were self-
arbitrator than in front of a jury. Perhaps this helps explain why the incomes of
employees represented by attorneys in arbitration exceeded the incomes of employees
represented by attorneys in litigation. See COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION,
supra note 31, at 28-29 (reporting that “whereas 69% of plaintiffs [represented by
attorneys] in mandatory employment arbitration had incomes under $100,000 per year,
84% of plaintiffs represented by attorneys in litigation had incomes under $100,000 per
year”); Gough, supra note 106, at 101.
185 See, e.g., Malin, supra note 101, at 296; Sherwyn et al., supra note 49, at
1575. Other commentators assert that arbitration is better for lower paid workers,
implying that it may be accessible to those who need to proceed pro se. See St. Antoine,
supra note 16, at 417-18; Estreicher, supra note 16, at 565.
186 Nielsen et al., supra note 87, at 188 (discussing sample of claims filed between
1998 and 2003). The authors found that while some of the benefit of attorney representation
was likely due to a selection effect, that attorneys also brought additional benefit to the
employees’ cases. Id. at 189 (citing, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER:
LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION (1990)); see also HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL
ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to
Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 339 (2008).
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represented in arbitration.187 Moreover, the incomes of plaintiffs
in employment arbitration were actually higher than those of
plaintiffs in employment litigation.188 Thus, it does not seem that
arbitration is a haven for the unrepresented.
Turning to results, when employees do choose to proceed
pro se in arbitration they do not fare particularly well. Colvin and
Pike’s analysis of AAA data showed that whereas employees
covered by employer-promulgated plans who were represented by
attorneys won 27.9% of the cases they brought, self-represented
employees won just 17% of their cases.189 When one looks at the
damages awarded to both groups of employees, this difference
is even more stark. Those prevailing employees represented by
attorneys recovered an average of $99,217, whereas the
unrepresented employees who prevailed were awarded an average
of $11,071 in damages.190 Thus, employees appear to be making a
rational decision when they choose not to file pro se claims in
arbitration. Perhaps arbitration is not the quick, simple process
some commentators might suggest.
If we consider our hypothetical plaintiff, Mark, we can
better understand why filing an employment case pro se is very
challenging in arbitration, just as it is in litigation. Attorneys
know that Mark ought to file a claim under the FLSA claiming an
entitlement to overtime. Mark, however, may not even be aware
that he has a viable claim. Further, Mark may well hesitate to
bring a claim, particularly unrepresented, for fear of retaliation.191
While potential retaliation is also an issue when one is represented
by an attorney, an attorney might give Mark more reassurance
187 Colvin & Pike, supra note 7, at 69. Colvin and Pike note that this figure is
only slightly higher than the 22.5% rate of pro se filings found in federal court
employment discrimination cases. Id. (citing Nielsen et al., supra note 87, at 200).
188 COMPARINGMANDATORY ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at 28-29.
189 Colvin & Pike, supra note 7, at 78. An older study from the collective
bargaining context found, similarly, that having an attorney significantly increased
either side’s likelihood of success when the opposing side was unrepresented. Richard
N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration
Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543 (1987).
190 Colvin & Pike, supra note 7, at 78. Of course this difference may be
attributed in part to a selection effect, as those employees with greater damages would
typically find it easier to secure attorney representation. See supra note 186.
191 See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and the
Silencing of the Brown Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779 (2013); David Weil &
Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of
Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 83 (2005) (citing
studies noting that although retaliation is proscribed “being fired is widely perceived to
be a consequence of exercising certain workplace rights”); see also BERNHARDT ET AL.,
supra note 4 at 3, 24-25 (reporting that 43% of surveyed workers who complained to
their employer or tried to form a union experienced illegal retaliation).
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that he would be protected from retaliation.192 The attorney also
provides legal information. Even if Mark were to raise a question
about not being paid for his hours the employer might well tell
him “that is the way it works,” or “that is how it is done.” A server
at Bananabee’s, such as Mark, likely has not had the opportunity
to complete a high level of education. He may not read or write
very well and almost certainly is not familiar with legal research.
Nor does Mark likely have the time to do legal research or to stop
by a law library. And, even were Mark to decide to make a claim
pro se he would have to figure out how to write a complaint, how
to submit that complaint, how to respond to the defenses the
company would no doubt raise, and how to conduct discovery. In
short, Mark will likely hesitate to file pro se in arbitration and if
he does file pro se will face significant challenges.
Our hypothetical client Lucinda likely faces challenges at
least as great as Mark should she think to try to present her
discrimination claim pro se in arbitration. Like Mark, Lucinda
may rationally fear retaliation if she seeks to present her claim.
She may not have gotten the promotion she wants, but she does
at least still have a job. Further, although Lucinda is likely
somewhat better educated than Mark, given their respective jobs,
she still will probably find daunting the factual and legal
challenges of presenting a claim for discrimination on the basis of
gender and ethnicity. Even assuming Lucinda files a timely
charge of discrimination with the EEOC or parallel state agency
she will likely have to pursue the claim on her own. In the vast
majority of the more than 90,000 claims filed with the EEOC the
agency either finds no cause to believe discrimination occurred
or else, most frequently, issues a notice of right to sue permitting
the employee to try to pursue her claim in court or in
arbitration.193 To prove that her failure to receive a promotion
was discriminatory Lucinda would need substantial factual
information on the nature of the position, the qualifications of
other applicants, and the promotion process. It is virtually
certain that the company would offer a non-discriminatory
192 See infra notes 241-51 and accompanying text for further discussion of
retaliation.
193 All Statutes: FY 1997-FY 2014, U.S. EEOC, http://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/all.cfm?renderforprint=1 (last visited Mar. 17, 2015); see also
Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited
Feb. 11, 2015) (explaining that when the EEOC fails to find for an employee it issues a
“notice of right to sue,” permitting the employee to file a private action on their own
behalf); see generally Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1410-
30 (2004) (discussing U.S. approach to resolving employment discrimination claims).
2015] DISARMING EMPLOYEES 1343
rationale for why Lucinda was not promoted, and Lucinda would
need to try to conduct discovery to defeat that rationale. Then,
even if she might prevail, Lucinda would need to try to prove her
entitlement to various types of relief. These are very tough cases
for attorneys, much less non-attorneys who are trying to make a
living at their job, perhaps search for alternative employment,
and hold together a personal life.194
In sum, arbitration does not provide substantial access to
justice to individual pro se employees. Such employees do
not typically file claims in arbitration, even though it is more
difficult for employees to obtain representation in arbitration
than in litigation.195 Moreover, when employees do file pro se in
arbitration, they do not do very well. We will now consider the
impact of mandatory employment arbitration on whether
employees can bring claims as part of groups, and how this
affects their access to justice.
3. Class Actions, Collective Actions, and Group Claims
While employment lawsuits brought by individuals are
more common,196 those brought in class actions or collectively197
are typically more successful and more potent.198 The annual
194 Perhaps arbitration is a reasonably hospitable venue for knowledgeable,
sophisticated plaintiffs who present claims that are fairly simple with regard to the
facts and law.
195 See supra Part III.B.1.
196 It appears that roughly 1.7% of the FLSA, ERISA, and employment
discrimination claims filed in federal court are class or collective actions. Drawing on
data provided by the Federal Court Cases Integrated Data Base, researcher Mark
Gough found that between 2007 and 2011 an average of 560 such class actions were
terminated each year. E-mail from Gough to Sternlight, supra note 140. Meanwhile,
roughly 33,000 FLSA, ERISA and discrimination claims were annually filed in federal
court in this same time frame. See supra notes 138-42. An older study looking at a
sample of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court between 1998 and
2003 similarly found that approximately 90% were filed by individuals, 6.5% by two or
more joint plaintiffs, and 1% by a certified class. Nielsen et al., supra note 87, at 189.
197 Note that aggregate claims brought under the FLSA are not covered by R.
23 class action provisions but rather by Section 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-
07, 216(b) (2012). The difference is important because FLSA claims are “opt-in,”
requiring each plaintiff who seeks to participate to file a consent-to-join form. See
Ruan, supra note 24, at 1117.
198 Nielsen et al., supra note 87, at 189 (finding that plaintiffs who sued jointly
with other plaintiffs, as members of a class, or with the assistance of the EEOC or a
public interest law firm, were less likely to be dismissed, less likely to lose on motion for
summary judgment, and more likely to win at trial than individual plaintiffs). The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau similarly found that when consumer finance
claims are brought through class actions they bring substantial benefit to the millions of
consumers who are members of those classes. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU, supra note 129 at Section 8, 1-3 (examining 422 consumer financial class action
settlements finalized in federal district courts between 2008 and 2012 and finding 350
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report on workplace class actions prepared by management law
firm Seyfarth Shaw199 showed that the top ten employment class
action settlements in 2013 paid out $638.15 million.200 For example,
Merrill Lynch paid $160 million to settle a race discrimination
class action,201 Bank of America paid $73 million to settle a wage
and hour collective action,202 and Colgate-Palmolive Co. paid $45.9
million to settle an ERISA class action.203 It seems evident that
this kind of exposure must discourage employers from violating
employment laws.204
Yet, as has been discussed, the Supreme Court is now
allowing companies to use mandatory arbitration in the business
and consumer settings to elude class and collective action
exposure,205 and lower courts have held that employers may
therefore use arbitration clauses to prevent their employees from
joining together in class or collective actions.206 While it is too soon
to tell how many employers will ultimately take advantage of the
opportunity to insulate themselves from class or collective
actions,207 it seems likely many will. A recent study of general
counsels showed that the number of arbitral class action
prohibitions more than doubled from 2012 to 2014, rising from
16.1 % to 42.7%,208 and management-side attorneys are describing
the Concepcion and American Express decisions as an opportunity
million class members secured more than $2 billion in cash relief and in-kind relief
exceeding $644 million).
199 The firm “defends employers in single-plaintiff lawsuits and in massive,
multi-district discrimination, ERISA/employee benefits, and wage and hour class and
collective actions under the FLSA and state laws.” Labor & Employment, SEYFARTH
SHAW LLP, http://www.seyfarth.com/labor-employment (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
200 SEYFARTH SHAW, supra note 11, at 11. The Report also observes, however,
that the 2013 top ten settlement figure was substantially less than the $840.43 million
total of the top ten settlements in 2012. Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 12.
203 Id. at 14. For a study of five major employment class actions, see NAT’L
WORKRIGHTS INST., CLASS ACTIONS: A LOOK AT THE RECORD (2011), available at
workrights.us/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Class-Action-PDF.pdf (summarizing results of
five major recent employment class actions and concluding that they served as “an effective
means for workers with legitimate claims against their employer that are not large enough
to support the expense of litigation to receive justice”) [hereinafter Class Actions].
204 Nonetheless, there is debate regarding the deterrence impact of class
actions. See infra notes 259-67 and accompanying text.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 56-83.
206 See supra text accompanying note 64. Such clauses can also potentially
eliminate multi-plaintiff suits. See infra notes 264-70 and accompanying text.
207 While we do not have good data on employment arbitration clauses, one
study of credit card arbitration clauses post-Concepcion found that 93.6% of the
clauses, “covering 99.9% of the credit card loans outstanding[,]” contained class action
prohibitions. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013
BYU L. REV. 1, 38 (2013).
208 See supra note 9.
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for companies to avoid expensive class actions.209 While some
authors have suggested that employers would be better off
allowing employees to sue them all at once in class actions than
opening themselves to numerous individual suits,210 the proposition
seems dubious. Employers well know, as has been shown here,211
that few individual employees will bring claims, and thus,
employers will protect themselves from most exposure by
eliminating class actions.212
To the extent employers use arbitration to prevent
employees from joining together in collective or class actions in
either litigation or arbitration, they significantly impede employees’
access to justice. As a numerical matter while far more
employment actions are filed by individuals than by classes or
collectives,213 the 560 class or collective actions214 filed in federal
court still cover far more employees than do the 30,000 individual
employment claims filed in federal court.215 Even a single class
action can easily include many thousands of employees.216 If the
average class or collective action included just 500 employees, the
numbers of employees litigating through class and collective
actions in federal court (roughly 280,000) far exceeds the number
of employees litigating individually.217
Is the estimate of 500 members in an average class or
collective action reasonable, or at least not too high? Precise data
on the size of all filed class and collective actions is not available,
but we can piece together an anecdotal picture of employment
class actions and it shows many are quite sizable. While the
Supreme Court found theWal-Mart class of over a million women
209 See supra note 60.
210 See Fisk, supra note 62, at 197-98 (arguing that employees may be able to
use offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel to apply a victory in one individual suit to
other individual claims); Malin, supra note 101, at 300 n.79 (contending that employees
can use the high cost of employers’ fees in individual arbitration claims to coerce
employers into settling).
211 See supra Part III.B.
212 See generally Estreicher, supra note 16, at 567-68 (asserting that
employers typically would not voluntarily agree to arbitrate small employment
disputes, post-dispute, because they don’t want to empower employees who otherwise
could not have obtained access to court).
213 See supra notes 140 and 196.
214 Id.
215 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Susan Antilla, Fighting the Old Boys’ Club, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2014, at B1 (discussing attempts by more than 40,000 women employees of Sterling
Jewelers to obtain class certification in arbitration claiming discriminatory pay
practices); see also generally Case Finder: Sterling Jewelers, COHEN MILSTEIN,
http://www.cohenmilstein.com/cases/97/sterling-jewelers (last visited Feb. 11, 2015)
(providing plaintiffs’ counsel’s description of pending arbitral class action).
217 Unfortunately, we lack data on employment class actions filed in state court.
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not certifiable,218 other classes have been quite substantial,
though not gargantuan. For example, the proposed Sterling
Jewelers class would contain more than 40,000 women.219 An
FLSA settlement reached with pharmaceutical company Novartis
covered an estimated 7,000 current and former sales
representatives.220 For other examples of employment class
actions one can look to a study issued by the National Workrights
Institute.221 It described a race and gender discrimination claim
brought by 15,000 employees against Boeing,222 a wage and hour
claim brought by over 5,000 employees against IBP Inc.,223 a
working conditions suit brought by over 30,000 workers against
The Gap,224 and a race discrimination claim brought by over 2,000
African-American employees against Coca-Cola.225 Thus, while
companies will try to use the Wal-mart decision to defeat future
class actions,226 sizable class and collective actions remain potent
tools for employees unless employers can use arbitration clauses
to eradicate those devices.
It is easy to see why so many more employees receive
access to justice through class and collective litigation rather than
through individual claims. First, class and collective actions are
essential for those employees who cannot feasibly afford to litigate
or arbitrate a claim individually.227 As we have seen with the
hypothetical claims of Mark and Lucinda, when an employee’s
218 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
219 See supra note 216.
220 Judy Greenwald, Novartis Agrees to $99M Settlement in Sales Representatives’
Wage Dispute, BUS. INS. (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/
20120125/NEWS07/120129931#.
221 NAT’LWORKRIGHTS INST., supra note 203.
222 Id. (discussing Williams v. Boeing Co., No. 2:98-CV-00761-MJP (W.D.
Wash Sep. 30, 1999) (reporting a $15 million settlement)).
223 Id. (discussing IBP v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 42 (2005)) (affirming award of
$11.4 million).
224 Id. (discussing Union of Needletrades Indus. and Textile Emps v. The Gap, No.
CV-01-1387 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. May 14, 1999) (reporting settlement including $20 million
in compensation and also creating a monitoring program to prevent future abuses)).
225 Id. (discussing AbDallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 1:98-CV-3679-RWS (N.D.
Ga.) (reporting a $192 million settlement)).
226 See, e.g., Mollie A. Murphy, Rule 23(b) After Wal-Mart: (Re) Considering a
“Unitary” Standard, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 721 (2012); George Rutherglen, The Way
Forward After Wal-Mart, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 871 (2012).
227 See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (stating
class actions are designed “‘to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide
the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights’”)
(quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions . . . permit the plaintiffs
to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”). Many courts have
specifically recognized the importance of class and collective actions in the employment
context. E.g., Phelps v. 3PD, Inc., 261 F.R.D. 548, 563 (D. Or. 2009); Sav-on Drug Stores,
Inc. v. Super. Ct., 96 P.3d 194, 209 (Cal. 2004).
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individual damages are fairly low it often makes little economic
sense either for the employee to file a claim or for a contingent fee
attorney to take the case.228 By contrast, when claims are grouped
together in class, collective or group actions, claims that were not
previously economically feasible may become feasible, and
individual employees may benefit.229 If an attorney can represent
not only Mark, but also 100 or more other employees at
Bananabee’s who were similarly forced to work unpaid hours, the
case suddenly makes economic sense. FLSA claims are particularly
attractive as collective actions because the harms individual
employees suffer are often so similar.230 While Lucinda’s claim of
gender discrimination may be harder to certify as a class, due to
greater potential differences between her situation and that of
other employees,231 certification may be possible if common
practices were followed in denying promotions to Lucinda and the
other class members or if non-promotion decisions were made by
a central decision maker.
Second, apart from economic feasibility, class or collective
claims can be essential to assist those employees who may not
realize they have been harmed, or that the harm violated a
law.232 Sometimes employees’ legal claims are obvious. For
example, an employee may be upset that he is only being paid
$16 per hour when the employer promised to pay $25. Or the
employee may be complaining that the employer is not providing
promised insurance, or has imposed certain dress or appearance
requirements. But, some harms are less obvious. Employees
may not realize they have been harmed at all, or they may not
realize that the harm was unlawful. For example, most
228 See supra text accompanying notes 145-97; see also Ansoumana v. Gristede’s
Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting individual suits may not be
feasible due to class members’ lack of financial resources and attorney disincentives).
229 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Asks Supreme Court to Hear Bias
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/business/
26walmart.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting that named plaintiffs in the Wal-Mart
suit received pay increases following filing of the suit).
230 These similarities make it easier to have the case certified under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 (requiring commonality between claims).
231 Her claim admittedly bears some resemblance to those of the unsuccessful
Wal-Mart plaintiffs. SeeWal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
232 See, e.g., Alexander & Prasad, supra note 3 at 1072-73 (presenting data from
study of low-wage workers showing most lacked substantive and procedural knowledge
regarding their employment rights); LEWISMALTBY, CAN THEY DO THAT? RETAKING OUR
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 1-4 (2009) (observing that many employees
are quite ignorant as to their rights); see also generally Harry Kalven Jr. & Maurice
Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686
(1941) (“Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to . . . group injuries for which
individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not
know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive.”).
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applicants for new positions or even promotions would have
little knowledge of discrimination because while they know that
they themselves did not get the job or promotion, they would
not have access to information regarding other successful or
unsuccessful applicants.233 While Lucinda believes she was a
victim of discrimination, many workers who were denied a
promotion would have no idea why they were denied the position.234
And even a worker who realizes they have been harmed
may not know that the harm violates a law. “[M]any workers,
especially low-wage workers, are unaware that their statutory
wage rights have been violated until they are specifically
informed of the violation.”235 Due to ignorance or even employer
misrepresentation a Bananabee’s employee such as Mark may
not realize he is entitled to be paid for all the hours he works,
or that he is entitled to a minimum wage, much less that he
may be entitled to extra payment for hours in excess of 40
hours per week.236 Not all employees will know that the FLSA
requires payment of overtime,237 that the Family Medical Leave
Act guarantees certain family leave benefits,238 or that a test
requiring physical strength might discriminate on the basis of
gender.239 Thus, one critically important aspect of both Rule 23
class actions and FLSA opt-in collective actions is that the
bringing of the lawsuit provides notice to the employees of a
potential legal violation.240
Third, the ability to file collective or class claims can be
essential to help employees who might fear retaliation if they had
233 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT, supra note 126, at 23 (applicants for
jobs “rarely know much”).
234 This phenomenon is discussed in the well-known case of Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649-50 (2007) (recounting, in dissent, how it
is common for employees such as plaintiff Lilly Ledbetter to be unaware of pay
disparities at private company). Similarly, Sterling Jewelers plaintiff said she had no
reason to believe her salary was unfair until she accidentally stumbled on documents
showing the salaries of her male counterparts. See Antilla, supra note 216.
235 Ruan, supra note 24, at 1121.
236 Even if an employee such as Mark is aware of these general entitlements, he
may not realize he is in a category of employment covered by the laws. Id. at 1121 & n.105
(citing cases in which companies misled employees about their entitlement to overtime pay).
237 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
238 See Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (2012).
239 See e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2012).
240 In most R. 23 class actions the court issues a notice describing the lawsuit
and provides the employee with the opportunity to “opt out” of the litigation. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (2014). In the FLSA context a notice of collection action is provided to
affected employees so that they can “opt in” to the suit before the statute of limitations
runs. Ruan, supra note 24, at 1122.
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to file claims individually.241 Workers such as Lucinda and Mark
who might think to file legal claims often perceive retaliation as a
significant risk.242 And these fears may be well founded.243 Though
it is unlawful for employers to retaliate against employees who
bring many claims,244 winning retaliation suits can be
challenging.245 Employers can potentially retaliate in ways that
are difficult to detect or prove, whether they make employees
miserable,246 reduce their hours, terminate them, induce them to
quit, or make it more difficult for them to secure alternative
employment.247 This threat of retaliation falls most heavily on the
most vulnerable workers—those who work for low wages, have
limited English proficiency or education, or are otherwise most
dependent on retaining their current job.248 Yet, whereas
prospective plaintiffs might, quite rationally, hesitate to file
individual claims, in contrast collective or class actions take the
spotlight off the individual employee. If Lucinda or Mark are part
of a large group action they will be and feel far less vulnerable
than they would be if they instituted an individual action.249
241 See supra note 191; see also Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions,
Dual Certification, and Wage Law Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 296-97 (2008) (discussing risks to workers who file external claims
rather than merely challenge employment practices internally).
242 Ruan, supra note 24, at 1106 (“Collective actions . . . have the advantage of
protecting vulnerable workers from drawing attention to their individual participation
and subjecting them to retaliatory measures.”); see also Estlund, The Development of
Employment Rights, supra note 23, at 64 (“Employees, especially those who are
terminable at will, may fear reprisals if they report or complain about misconduct
(unless they have already quit or been fired).”).
243 In fiscal year 2013, 41.1% of the 93,727 employees who filed claims of
discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleged that
their employer had engaged in retaliation. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2014,
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 12, 2015); see also ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET
AL., supra note 4, at 3 (finding 43% of surveyed low-wage workers who complained of
workplace violations claimed they were retaliated against).
244 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
245 SeeWeil & Pyles, supra note 191, at 86.
246 When Paula Jones brought her sexual harassment claim against President
Bill Clinton she alleged that her employer engaged in a campaign to mistreat her
including moving her office, changing her job duties, and “failing to give her flowers on
Secretary’s Day[.]” Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 665 (E.D. Ark. 1998). While the
court found these actions legally insignificant, and granted Clinton’s motion for summary
judgment, these kinds of actions have led many employees to feel miserable. Id. at 679.
247 E.g., Washington v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)
(reversing grant of summary judgment for company in retaliation case, observing that
employee complaints could be chilled if management were free to make seemingly
minor workplace changes that they knew would critically affect the employees, and
observing that “Catbert, the Evil Director of Human Resources in the comic strip
Dilbert, delights in pouncing on employees’ idiosyncratic vulnerabilities”).
248 Ruan, supra note 24, at 1120.
249 Id. at 1119-20 (emphasizing risks of retaliation to most vulnerable
employees including immigrants and low-wage workers).
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Fourth, class actions and collective actions can be used to
procure broad injunctive relief that might not be available to
individuals. For example, if the plaintiff’s goal is to change the
way an employer trains, hires, or compensates its employees, an
individual lawsuit may not be sufficient. While legislation such as
Title VII allows courts to issue broad equitable relief in individual
cases,250 some courts have expressed reluctance to do so.251 At
minimum it will be harder for individual employees than it would
be for a class or group to muster the evidence necessary to
convince a court to issue broad injunctive relief.252 Thus, if
Lucinda were to bring and win or settle her discriminatory
promotion case it is highly unlikely her employer would broadly
change the way it promotes women. Similarly, were Mark to
bring his claim individually he might recover his own unpaid
wages without causing the company to restructure the work
environment for others. By contrast, class and collective actions
can lead to broader injunctive relief. The 2013 Seyfarth Shaw
Report reveals that every one of the “top ten” employment class
action settlements for the year included significant injunctive
relief such as “modification of internal personnel practices and
procedures; oversight and monitoring of corporate practice; or
mandatory training of supervisory personnel and employees.”253
In contrast, a study of the relief gained by individual employees
showed they received almost no non-monetary relief in either
litigation or arbitration.254
Fifth, it seems likely that the availability of class and
collective actions deters companies from violating employment
laws.255 Such actions threaten companies with the possibility of
having to pay for broad relief, as well as having to defend a costly
250 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012); see also Ruffin v. Great Dane Trailers,
969 F.2d 989, 993 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming use of broad injunction in individual suit);
EEOC v. KarenKim, Inc., 698 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing lower court’s denial of
broad-ranging injunction to prevent recurrence of discrimination in an individual suit).
251 Brief for National Workrights Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, at 14-15, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Ruan,
supra note 24, at 1123; see also generally Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated,
516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding “pattern or practice” discrimination claim could
only be pursued in a class action, and not by one or more individual employees).
252 See EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 840-41 (7th Cir. 2013)
(discussing standard of proof for injunctive relief in discrimination cases).
253 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, supra note 11, at 11 (including requirements that
company abstain from inquiring into genetic information, make available American Sign
Language interpreters for important workplace communications, adopt new interview
policies, and develop and apply a new pension determination formula for all employees).
254 See COMPARINGMANDATORY ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at 24.
255 See generally Kalven, Jr. & Rosenfield, supra note 232 (asserting that twin
goals of class actions are compensation and deterrence).
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class action.256 Class and collective suits seem more likely to deter
company misconduct than the mere threat of suits by individual
employees who may not even choose to file a claim, for reasons
discussed above.257 Yet while the deterrence impact of class
actions may seem obvious it has, admittedly, been disputed or at
least questioned by some.258 For example, after completing an
empirical study finding that employment discrimination class
actions did not have substantial and long lasting impact on the
stock price of the defendant companies, Michael Selmi urged that
the remedies in employment discrimination suits ought to be
toughened so that such actions would have a greater impact on
corporate defendants.259 Yet Selmi still found that companies took
employment class actions quite seriously,260 and that “[c]lass action
litigation has brought jobs and monetary relief to thousands of
individuals, and has likely ended or significantly altered many
discriminatory practices.”261 Thus, employers can greatly reduce
the deterrent effect of employment discrimination laws by
eliminating group or class claims.262
While this section has focused on how employers are using
mandatory arbitration to prevent employees from joining together
in class or collective claims, it is also important to note that some
mandatory arbitration clauses even preclude employees from
joining together claims with as few as one other employee.263 For
256 See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 106
(2006) (querying whether anyone doubts the deterrence effect of class actions).
257 See Ruan, supra note 24, at 1122 (observing that “[t]he sheer magnitude
and scope of class litigation enhances the likelihood that a targeted employer will
comply with the law”); Brief for National Workrights Institute as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, supra note 251, at 14 (arguing that an “essential objective of
a class action is to get a sufficiently broad and substantial corrective order to stop the
wrongdoing and to deter future misconduct”).
258 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them:
Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399 (2014) (urging that class
action benefits, including deterrence, have not been proven, and that the class action
device ought to be reined in).
259 Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1321 (2003).
260 Id. at 1250.
261 Id. at 1321 (stating “this is an instance where the evidence is clearly mixed”).
262 Samuel Estreicher has postulated that because more claims will be possible
in arbitration than in litigation, the imposition of mandatory arbitration may actually
increase rather than decrease deterrence. Estreicher, supra note 16, at 566 n.20.
However, as discussed earlier the paucity of claims actually brought in arbitration defeats
this hypothesis. See supra Part III.B.
263 See Fisk, supra note 62 at 192-99, (arguing that courts should not interpret
Concepcion to allow employers to preclude employees from engaging in joint litigations
that are not class actions). For an interesting discussion of some of the social, moral
and legal implications of group litigation that is not class action litigation, see, e.g.,
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example, the arbitration clause discussed in In re D.R. Horton264
provided that the arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s individual
claims” and “will not have the authority to consolidate the claims
of other employees.”265 In litigation, by contrast, rules of civil
procedure typically allow claimants with common issues of law or
fact to join together in a single action.266 Although the preclusion
of class and collective claims is more dramatic than the mere
preclusion of group claims, the latter is harmful to employees as
well for several reasons. First, sometimes a claim that was
economically infeasible may become feasible merely by joining
together two or three similarly situated employees. If Lucinda
could help her prospective attorney identify just a few other
employees who were also allegedly denied promotions on the basis
of their gender or ethnicity the claim may make more sense,
economically. Two or more employees will have greater damages
and can also potentially front more of the costs of the litigation.
Also, it appears that lawsuits filed on behalf of more than one
employee have a higher rate of success than lawsuits filed on
behalf of a single employee.267
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral and Legal Obligations,
91 B.U. L. REV. 87 (2011).
264 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012), rev’d, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d
344 (5th Cir. 2013).
265 357 N.L.R.B. 184 at 1; see also Malin, supra note 33, at 402 (noting that
employers’ arbitration clauses commonly preclude employees from joining together
with other employees, as well as from participating in class or collective actions).
266 Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[p]ersons may
join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or
in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all
plaintiffs will arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (2014). Many if not most state
rules of civil procedure are similar. E.g., NEV. R. CIV. P. 20. (“All persons may join in
one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or of fact common to all these
persons will arise in the action.”).
267 See Nielsen et al., supra note 87, at 189. This study of 1,672 employment
discrimination cases found that 108 of the lawsuits involved two or more plaintiffs but
were not class or collective actions. Although the study did not separately report on the
success of these 108 claims it did show that, at least when examined together with 46
cases where EEOC intervened as a party and 18 certified class actions, these collective
claims were far more successful than claims brought by single individuals. In
particular, the 152 collective claims, including the 108 multiple plaintiff claims, were
“less likely to be dismissed and less likely to lose on motion for summary judgment[,]”
and more likely to prevail at trial. Id. Further, the trial success rate of the collective
claims was 50% as opposed to the 30% chance of success for plaintiffs overall. Id. While
recognizing that these statistics may well have been influenced by mixing the multi-
plaintiff cases with the EEOC plaintiff and class action cases, it seems likely the multi-
plaintiff cases alone are significantly different from the individual plaintiff cases given
that they represent 108 of the 152 claims studied in the collective action variable.
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IV. WHAT IS TO BEDONE?268
In sum, employers’ use of mandatory arbitration provisions
is “disarming” employees—denying them the opportunity they
would have had to enforce their legal rights through litigation.
While the litigation system is not as accessible to employees as
many would like, the imposition of mandatory arbitration has
worsened rather than improved the situation. In particular, the
use of arbitration clauses makes it more difficult for employees to
bring a claim by making it harder for them to secure
representation, and by often eliminating their opportunity to bring
class, collective, or even group claims. Nor has employment
arbitration proven to be a hospitable forum for pro se employees.
If neither litigation nor mandatory arbitration provide
sufficient access to justice for most employees some will suggest
we should look for other ways in which we might protect
employees’ rights. We can easily imagine alternatives to litigation
or mandatory arbitration including encouraging employers to work
cooperatively with employees on self-governance,269 better funding
government agencies,270 figuring out ways to help employees use
social media or other technology to present their claims,271
encouraging unions to represent non-members in employment
disputes,272 setting up labor courts or governmentally sponsored
arbitration as exist in some other countries,273 mandating that
companies agree to arbitrate employment disputes if arbitration
is desired by employees,274 or many other creative options.
Perhaps some of these solutions make sense and perhaps some
of them will be achieved one day, maybe even in some of our
lifetimes. Our current litigation system is not ideal, and we
268 Apologies to Vladimir Lenin. Lenin’s 1902 pamphlet, “What is to be Done?,”
was said to have been inspired by Nikolai Chemyshevsky’s 1886 novel of the same title.
269 See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 26.
270 Cf. FARHANG, supra note 3 at 16 (noting U.S. reliance on private enforcement).
271 See Jeremy R. McClane, Class Action in the Age of Twitter: A Dispute
Systems Approach, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213 (2014) (considering potential use of new
technologies to serve some ends previously achieved through class actions); see also
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses, supra note 85, at 124-26 (discussing
possible uses of social media to help consumers bring procedurally difficult claims).
272 See supra note 23.
273 See Sternlight, In Search, supra note 193, at 1430-67 (discussing Great
Britain’s and Australia’s approaches for resolving employment discrimination claims);
see also Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 5 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1674-75 (2005) (considering whether arbitration imposed on mandatory
basis by federal government would be just).
274 See Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If
Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82 (2007).
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should continue to search out better procedural alternatives for
resolving employment disputes.275
In the short term, however, I favor a far simpler option:
passage of the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA).276 Initially proposed
in 2007277 and subsequently revised various times,278 the AFA
would, among other things,279 prohibit employers from mandating
that their employees resolve their employment claims through
arbitration.280 This statute would effectively reverse those Supreme
Court decisions that extended the FAA to allow employers to bar
their employees from the courtroom.281 Prohibiting employers from
requiring employees to resolve disputes through arbitration is
consistent with the legislative history of the FAA, as the original
drafters never contemplated that the FAA would apply broadly to
all employees.282 Also, as employers did not broadly begin to
mandate arbitration until the 1990s, we know that our workplace
can function quite effectively without mandatory arbitration. While
passage of the AFA does not at this point seem imminent,283
perhaps as the true nature of mandatory employment arbitration
275 See, e.g., Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, supra
note 273, at 1674-75 (urging that while privately imposed mandatory arbitration is
unfair we should continue to search for alternatives to litigation); Sternlight, In
Search, supra note 193, at 1498-99 (finding that a combination of formal and informal
processes is needed to best resolve employment discrimination claims).
276 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015);
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015).
277 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
278 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
279 The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015 provided “no predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.” H.R.
1844 § 402(a).
280 Id. at § 402; see also S. 1133 § 402.
281 See supra Part I.
282 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
283 The 2013 version of the AFA was never referred out of committee. Text of
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/113/s878/text (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). The Bill had somewhat more support
back in 2008 and 2009, when Democrats had just taken the Presidency and controlled
both Houses of Congress. The Bill was reintroduced April 29, 2015. It has been referred
to committee but no other action has been taken. For a good description of the Act’s
history, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness
Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457,
458-63 (2011). Another scholar has described the AFA as “oft-introduced, oft-ignored.”
Nancy A. Welsh, What is “(Im)Partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals? 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 405 (2010); see also Lipsky et al., supra note 8 at 139 (noting that
“AFA was strongly supported by many Democrats in Congress but opposed by most
Republicans,” and that after Republicans took control of the House after the 2010
elections the possibility that the AFA might be passed into law in the near future “was
virtually eliminated”).
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becomes better understood a wider coalition of legislators will come
to appreciate the benefits of that proposed statute.284
Some nonetheless suggest that the AFA is too extreme,
and that we should only regulatemandatory arbitration to ensure
it is fair rather than abolish the practice altogether.285 Such a
proposal has proved attractive to many in the dispute resolution
community.286 Senator Sessions (Republican, Alabama) proposed
legislation in 2000 that would purportedly accomplish this end.287
However, upon reflection the “mend it don’t end it” approach does
not work for several reasons. First, it is highly unlikely that a
measure aimed at ensuring mandatory arbitration is “fair” would
address all the most important problems. While such a law might
insist arbitrators be neutral or might prevent employers from
imposing high costs it likely would not bar employers from using
arbitration to prevent employees from joining together in class or
group actions. Indeed, for every practice Congress might seek to
proscribe, employers could come up with another way to skew
arbitration that was not yet on the prohibited list.288 Second,
advocates of such regulatory legislation have not given enough
thought to how such a measure would be enforced. As we have
seen with unconscionability, it is time consuming and expensive
284 While full discussion of the AFA exceeds the scope of this article, and while
some critics of the Act urge it is overly broad, see infra note 285, this Author believes
that some possible overbreadth is warranted to protect numerous employees and
consumers from unfair practices. A year ago, Pres. Obama issued an Executive Order
providing that companies who enter contracts with the federal government providing
goods and services in amounts in amounts exceeding one million dollars could not
mandate that their employees resolve through arbitration claims of employment
discrimination or sexual assault or sexual harassment. Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed.
Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).
285 E.g., Cole, supra note 283 at 498-99 (urging that Congress reject the AFA as
too extreme but, instead, adopt a bill to allow consumers to participate in class actions
either in litigation or in arbitration); Malin, supra note 101, at 290; St. Antoine, supra
note 16, at 433-34 (noting that National Academy of Arbitrators declined to express any
opinion on AFA at October 2009 meeting but did recommend that any legally permissible
form of mandatory arbitration should include due process protections).
286 See Malin, supra note 101 at 289-90; St. Antoine, supra note 16 at 433-34;
see also Cole, supra note 283 at 504 (urging that while AFA supposedly goes too far,
Congress should adopt legislation “designed to preserve individuals’ rights to proceed
through class arbitration or class actions in court”). My students, similarly, often urge
that it is too radical to prohibit mandatory arbitration altogether and that it should be
sufficient to regulate to ensure arbitration is “fair.”
287 Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, 106 CONG. REC. S10,
619, 10626-27 (2000), 2000 WL 1532688. This proposed legislation never made it out of
committee. See S. 3210 (106th): Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/s3210#overview (last visited
Feb. 17, 2015).
288 See generally Blomgren Amsler, supra note 90 at 32, 41-42 (discussing that
companies’ use of mandatory arbitration can be viewed as a “systems design problem”
suffering from various “structural bias[es]”).
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for employees to try to show that an employer’s program is
deficient, so merely setting out fairness requirements would not
ensure that employers’ plans meet those requirements.289 Nor is it
likely Congress would authorize establishment of a new
administrative agency to monitor whether employers’ plans are
compliant.290 Thus, regulating rather than eliminating mandatory
employment arbitration seems infeasible. We should, instead, ban
the harmful practice of allowing employers to force their
employees out of the litigation setting.
CONCLUSION
On paper, the United States has strong laws protecting its
workers, but in practice, these laws fall far short if they cannot be
enforced. This article has shown that employers are using the
practice of mandatory arbitration to prevent employees from
bringing claims to enforce their rights in any forum, either
litigation or arbitration. Mandating arbitration makes it more
difficult for employees to participate in group or class actions, and
more difficult to obtain legal representation. Thus, if we continue
to rely on a system in which employees bring claims to protect
their own rights it is critically important to prohibit employers
from using mandatory arbitration to disarm their employees. The
proposed Arbitration Fairness Act is our best hope of continuing
to protect employees from illegal mistreatment.
While prohibiting employers from using mandatory
arbitration will not ensure that employees have access to justice,
taking this step will at least move us in a positive direction.
Absent mandatory arbitration at least a few more employees
would be able to secure legal representation, participate in class
or collective actions, and present their claims in court. Companies
would continue to face litigation pressure and thus have reason to
think more creatively and expansively about ways to comply with
the law and promote their employees’ wellbeing. Thus, by passing
the Arbitration Fairness Act we can undertake to find more and
better ways to provide employees with access to justice.
289 E.g., Bland, supra note 79, at 1; see also Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92-97 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring & dissenting) (critiquing
majority for imposing burden of proof on party resisting arbitration to show process is unfair).
290 As we have seen, we are not eager to establish new bureaucracies in the
United States. See supra note 3.
